This paper explores how multinationals affect underdeveloped regions through the generation of linkages. It is shown that the linkage effect of multinationals on the host country is more likely to be favorable when the good that multinationals produce uses intermediate goods intensively, when there are large costs of communication between the headquarters and the production plant, and when the home and host countries are not too different in terms of the variety of intermediate goods produced. If these conditions are reversed, then multinationals could even hurt the developing economy, formalizing the idea that multinationals may create enclave economies within developing countries.

Aggregate economies of scale are the engine of growth in models with quasi-endogenous research: larger populations are linked to a higher stock of non-rival ideas (see Jones, 1995; Kortum, 1997; Eaton and Kortum, 2001). Thus, growth rates of per capita real output are proportional to population growth rates, gy = ε · gL, where the parameter ɛ is the efficiency-size elasticity.

This paper presents a theory of trade agreements where "politics" play an central role. This stands in contrast with the standard theory, where even politically-motivated governments sign trade agreements only to deal with terms-of-trade externalities. We develop a model where governments may be motivated to sign a trade agreement both by the presence of standard terms-of-trade externalities and by the desire to commit vis-a-vis domestic industrial lobbies. The model is rich in implications. In particular, it predicts that trade agreements result in deeper trade liberalization when governments are more politically motivated (provided capital mobility is sufficiently high) and when capital can move more freely across sectors. Also, governments tend to prefer a commitment in the form of tariff ceilings rather than exact tariff levels. In a fully dynamic specification of the model, trade liberalization occurs in two stages: an immediate slashing of tariffs and a subsequent gradual reduction of tariffs. The immediate tariff cut is a reflection of the terms-of-trade motive for the agreement, while the domestic-commitment motive is reflected in the gradual phase of trade liberalization. Finally, the speed of trade liberalization is higher when capital is more mobile across sectors.

This paper quantifies the gains from openness arising from trade and multinational production (MP). We present a model that captures key dimensions of the interaction between these two flows: trade and MP are competing ways to serve a foreign market, MP relies on imports of intermediate goods from the home country, and foreign affiliates of multinationals can export part of their output. The calibrated model implies that the gains from trade can be twice as high as the gains calculated in trade-only models, while the gains from MP are slightly lower than the gains computed in MP-only models.

An argument often heard in favor of trade agreements is that, by committing to free trade, a government can credibly distance itself from domestic lobbies, But several existing models of endogenous protection suggest that governments have no interest in foreclosing interest group pressures since governments derive rents from the political process. We develop a small‐country model in which factors are sector‐specific in the short run but mobile in the long run. We show that in this setting a government may be worse off in the political equilibrium than under commitment to free trade, and hence it may value a trade agreement.

The empirical observation that “large firms tend to export, whereas small firms do not” has transformed the way economists think about the determinants of international trade. Yet, it has had surprisingly little impact on how economists think about trade policy. Under very general conditions, we show that from the point of view of a country that unilaterally imposes trade taxes to maximize domestic welfare, the self‐selection of heterogeneous firms into exports calls for import subsidies on the least profitable foreign firms. In contrast, our analysis does not provide any rationale for export subsidies or taxes on the least profitable domestic firms.

We present a comprehensive data set on the bilateral activity of multinational firms, with focus on two variables: affiliate revenues and the number of affiliates across country pairs. Our basic data are from UNCTAD and include 59 countries, an average over 1996-2001. We implement an extrapolation procedure that fills in missing values using, alternately, FDI stocks and the bilateral number of M&A transactions. Our dataset allows for the analysis of new patterns of multinational production activities across countries, by taking into account firm rather than balance of payment variables, and both the intensive and extensive margins of multinational activities.

Because of scale effects, idea-based growth models imply that larger countries should be much richer than smaller ones. New trade models share the same counterfactual feature. In fact, new trade models exhibit other counterfactual implications associated with scale effects: import shares decrease and relative income levels increase too steeply with country size. We argue that these implications are largely a result of the standard assumption that countries are fully integrated domestically. We depart from this assumption by treating countries as collections of regions that face positive costs to trade among themselves. The resulting model is largely consistent with the data.

We present a dynamic quantitative trade and migration model that incorporates downward nominal wage rigidities and show how this framework can generate changes in unemployment and labor participation that match those uncovered by the empirical literature studying the China shock. We find that the China shock leads to average welfare increases in most US states, including many that experience unemployment during the transition. However, nominal rigidities reduce the overall US gains by around two-thirds. In addition, there are 18 states that experience welfare losses in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity that would have experienced gains without it.

Recently, Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (GRH; “External Economies and International Trade: Redux,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 [2010], 829–858) proposed a novel way to think about the implications of international trade in the presence of national external economies at the industry level. Instead of perfect competition and two industries, GRH assume Bertrand competition and a continuum of industries. GRH conclude that the equilibrium is unique if transport costs are low, that there is no trade for high transport costs, and that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies when transport costs are intermediate. In this note we reexamine the equilibrium analysis under different transport costs for a single industry (partial equilibrium) version of GRH’s model. We confirm many of GRH’s results, but also find that there are circumstances under which there are multiple equilibria, including equilibria in which trade patterns run counter to “natural” comparative advantage, and also find that there is a profitable deviation to the mixed-strategy equilibrium postulated by GRH for intermediate trading costs. We propose an alternative set of strategies for this case and establish that they constitute an equilibrium.