When firms can issue debt at discrete dates only, debt maturity becomes an effective tool to constrain investment and debt policies. In the absence of other frictions, single-period debt restores first-best investment. With market freezes, long-maturity debt amplifies underinvestment and the leverage ratchet effect, while short maturity mitigates these distortions. Calibrating the model to U.S. nonfinancial firms shows that choosing the optimal debt maturity can reduce the cost of commitment problems and market frictions by up to 4% of firm value. A decomposition of the equilibrium credit spread reveals that the component associated with time-inconsistent debt and investment policies is largest when leverage and default risk are low, and is substantially reduced by shorter debt maturities.

We consider a dynamic model of investment in which a firm can hold inventory to mitigate the price risk of an input commodity. Our model predicts that inventory hedges against net worth risk by smoothing investment in capital, regardless of the level of current net worth. Savings enhance the operational hedge offered by inventory, because they better conserve net worth when the commodity price is low. These predictions are confirmed in a sample of U.S. manufacturing corporations. We find that the empirical sensitivity of inventory investment to price changes is positive for any level of firms’ net worth. Savings and inventory are both positively related to financing constraints and cash-flow risk, but investment is more sensitive to inventory. Received November 13, 2017, Editorial decision September 25, 2018 by Editor Uday Rajan.

This paper studies the quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending and value metrics of efficiency and welfare in a dynamic model of banks that are financed by debt and equity, undertake maturity transformation, are exposed to credit and liquidity risks, and face financing frictions. We show that (1) there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between bank lending, welfare, and capital requirements, (2) liquidity requirements unambiguously reduce lending, efficiency, and welfare, and (3) resolution policies contingent on observed capital, such as prompt corrective action, dominate in efficiency and welfare terms (noncontingent) capital and liquidity requirements.

We show that a structural model incorporating firms’ real options and financial leverage decisions can generate forward-looking equity distributions of various shapes, resulting in highly flexible implied volatility surfaces. In contrast, exogenously specified models with stochastic volatility and jumps can only generate smiles and downward-sloping curves. We explain the observed negative relationship between downward sloping implied volatility surfaces and the value of real options: real options contribute positively to equity skewness, and more so the more convex their payoff, which is the case when the real option is “at-the-money” and has the lowest value.

We develop a model that endogenizes dynamic financing, investment, and cash retention/payout policies in order to analyze the effect of financial flexibility on firm value. We show that the value of financing flexibility depends on the costs of external financing, the level of corporate and personal tax rates that determine the effective cost of holding cash, the firm's growth potential and maturity, and the reversibility of capital. Through simulations, we demonstrate that firms facing financing frictions should simultaneously borrow and lend, and we examine the nature of dynamic debt and liquidity policies and the value associated with corporate liquidity.

Banks predominantly issue nondilutive CoCos, contrary to the suggestion that CoCos should be dilutive to reduce risk-taking. In an agency model of two moral hazards, we show that, although dilutive CoCos deter ex ante risk-taking and prevent banks from being undercapitalized, penalizing shareholders of a distressed bank with dilution leads to ex post risk-shifting. CoCos’ design and risk implications depend on bank capitalization: equity-constrained banks prefer nondilutive CoCos because they maximize the financing capacity by tackling ex post risk shifting only. Nondilutive CoCos can be used to implement the constrained social optimum for highly leveraged banks, and regulators can induce appropriate CoCo designs with capital regulations.

We examine the effect of introducing credit default swaps (CDSs) on firm value. Our model allows for dynamic investment and financing, and bondholders can trade in the CDS market. The model incorporates both negative and positive effects of CDSs. CDS markets lead to more liquidations, but they also reduce the probability of costly debt renegotiation and reduce costly equity financing. After calibrating the model, we find that firm value increases by 2.9% on average with the introduction of a CDS market. Firms also invest more and increase leverage. The effect on firm value is strongest for small, financially constrained, and low productivity firms.

This paper studies the quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending and value metrics of efficiency and welfare in a dynamic model of banks that are financed by debt and equity, undertake maturity transformation, are exposed to credit and liquidity risks, and face financing frictions. We show that (1) there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between bank lending, welfare, and capital requirements, (2) liquidity requirements unambiguously reduce lending, efficiency, and welfare, and (3) resolution policies contingent on observed capital, such as prompt corrective action, dominate in efficiency and welfare terms (noncontingent) capital and liquidity requirements.