Poor transparency of asset-backed securities (ABS) exacerbated the latest subprime lending crisis. In response, the European Central Bank introduced the ABS loan-level reporting initiative, obliging originators to disclose quarterly loan-by-loan information. However, does this increase in transparency alleviate the agency problems inherent in securitization? To answer this question, we examine a novel dataset of 107 ABS pools that are backed by more than 2.8 million loans for small and medium-sized enterprises from the first securitization repository in Europe. The results show that the increase in transparency indeed has valuable effects for investors, inducing originators to improve pool performance and diversification for existing as well as newly issued ABS. These effects persist for a large set of control variables and a broad variety of robustness tests.

We examine the developments of depositor knowledge, attitudes, and behavior throughout the recent financial crisis and discuss their impact on bank run risk. Based on a self-collected data set surveying depositors before (2007), at (2008), and after the peak of the crisis (2009), we observe a worrying dynamic pattern. At the peak, depositors knew more about deposit insurance, placed more importance on deposit security, and slightly raised their deposits. However, in the aftermath of the crisis the enhanced depositor knowledge proved to be non-permanent while the increased importance of deposit security and the exposure of depositors persisted. The proportion of completely uninformed, strongly involved, and highly exposed depositors, who carry the highest risk of triggering a bank run, was reduced around the peak of the crisis but rebounded strongly afterwards, even exceeding pre-crisis levels. These findings point to a higher bank run risk in the aftermath than during the financial crisis.

Existing research documents that incoming CEOs in non-financial firms tend to take an “earnings bath”. They reduce their first year’s profits through discretionary expenses, blame the “bad outcome” on their predecessors, lower the performance benchmark, and save income for subsequent accounting periods. Identifying such an earnings bath for incoming CEOs in banks requires us to disentangle under-provisioning, which may have triggered the turnover event, and the earnings bath. For a sample of German savings banks over the period 1993–2012, we find that incoming CEOs increase discretionary expenses and that this increase is stronger for incoming CEOs from outside the bank than for insiders. We further show that CEOs coming from outside increase discretionary expenses during their first year in charge even if the default risk of the bank is low and the stock of risk provisions relative to risk exposure is high. Therefore, we conclude that the effects are only partially driven by incoming CEOs who rectify discretionary expenses by insufficient existing risk provisions, and that big bath accounting plays an important role in explaining discretionary expenses during CEO turnovers.

Section 340f of the German Commercial Code allows banks to provision against the special risks inherent to the banking business by building hidden reserves. Beyond risk provisioning, these reserves are implicitly accepted as an earnings management device. By analyzing financial statements of German banks for the period 1997–2009, we see these hidden reserves being used to (1) avoid a negative net income, (2) avoid a drop in net income compared to the previous year, (3) avoid a shortfall in net income compared to a peer group, and (4) reduce the variability of banks’ net income over time. Our analysis also shows that if bank managers are unable to reach the targets as set out in (1)–(3), they are more inclined to keep the hidden reserves for use in future periods.