Institutions—quality of contract enforcement, property rights, shareholder protection, and the like—have received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet trade theory has not considered the implications of institutional differences, beyond treating them simply as different technologies or taxes. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a simple model of international trade in which institutional differences are modelled within the framework of incomplete contracts. We show that doing so reverses many of the conclusions obtained by equating institutions with productivity. Institutional differences as a source of comparative advantage imply, among other things, that the less developed country may not gain from trade and factor prices may actually diverge as a result of trade. Second, we test empirically whether institutions act as a source of trade, using data on U.S. imports disaggregated by country and industry. The empirical results provide evidence of “institutional content of trade”: institutional differences are an important determinant of trade flows.

This paper analyzes the effect of comparative advantage in international trade on a country's level of financial development. Countries with comparative advantage in financially intensive goods experience a higher demand for external finance, and therefore financial development. By contrast, financial development is lower in countries that primarily export goods which do not rely on external finance. We use disaggregated trade data to develop a measure of a country's external finance need of exports, and demonstrate this effect empirically. In order to overcome the simultaneity problem, we develop a novel instrumentation strategy based on the exogenous geographic determinants of trade patterns.