[This paper shows that during episodes of market turmoil, 13F institutional investors with short trading horizons sell their stockholdings to a larger extent than 13F institutional investors with longer trading horizons. This creates price pressure for stocks held mostly by short-horizon investors, which, as a consequence, experience larger price drops, and subsequent reversals, than stocks held mostly by long-horizon investors. These findings, obtained after controlling for the withdrawals experienced by the investors, are not driven by other institutional investors' and firms' characteristics. Overall, the evidence indicates that investors with short horizons amplify the effects of market-wide negative shocks by demanding liquidity at times when other potential buyers' capital is scarce.]

This paper shows that during episodes of market turmoil, 13F institutional investors with short trading horizons sell their stockholdings to a larger extent than 13F institutional investors with longer trading horizons. This creates price pressure for stocks held mostly by short-horizon investors, which, as a consequence, experience larger price drops, and subsequent reversals, than stocks held mostly by long-horizon investors. These findings, obtained after controlling for the withdrawals experienced by the investors, are not driven by other institutional investors' and firms' characteristics. Overall, the evidence indicates that investors with short horizons amplify the effects of market-wide negative shocks by demanding liquidity at times when other potential buyers'capital is scarce.

ABSTRACT We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). The U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.