Prior research finds that signals of remediation of internal control weaknesses do not guarantee that all weaknesses are fully resolved. However, why certain remediation strategies fail is unclear. This study examines how remediation timing and actions affect the likelihood of a failed remediation. I predict and find that the likelihood of a failed remediation is decreasing in both the time a company takes to remediate and in the extent of remediation actions employed. Importantly, this study documents that disclosures of material changes in internal control provide information useful in assessing the likelihood of a failed remediation, as well as evidence that prompt remediation does not necessarily result in a successful remediation. Moreover, I find that there are consequences to remediation failures in the form of a higher likelihood of management and board turnover. Finally, I find evidence that economic benefits of remediation found in prior research may be understated. This study can provide stakeholders with insights into how the nature, extent, and timing of a remediation strategy can reduce the likelihood of a failed remediation.

We use unique disclosures in the insurance industry to examine whether client-engaged specialists (i.e., external actuaries) affect opportunism within the claim loss reserve. Using a fixed-effects approach, we find that external actuaries significantly affect the opportunism in the claim loss reserve, approaching half the effect of the auditor. With respect to actuary characteristics, we find a positive (negative) association between actuary permissiveness (actuary size) and opportunism in the claim loss reserve. In additional analyses, we find that the relation between actuary permissiveness and claim loss reserve opportunism is stronger when insurers have incentives to opportunistically manage the claim loss reserve. This relation continues to persist in the presence of high-quality auditors. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that client-engaged external actuaries can be used to support opportunistic claim loss reserve estimates.

This study examines whether auditors' evaluation and reporting of firms' internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) affects firm operational efficiency. Prior research indicates that the strength of internal controls is positively associated with economic benefits. However, notwithstanding the underlying strength of controls, whether the mere presence of an ICFR audit provides similar economic benefits is unclear. We predict and find that small firms with ICFR audits have significantly higher overall operational efficiency than small firms with only management ICFR reports, even after controlling for underlying internal control strength. We find this effect manifests through improvements in inventory turnover and innovation, and through increased relative product market share. Separately, we find ICFR audits are associated with lower efficiency in SG&A expenses. Cross‐sectional analyses indicate that the mechanism by which ICFR audits affect overall operational efficiency is through auditor detection of internal control problems and through knowledge spillover from auditing other highly efficient firms in the audit office's metropolitan statistical area. These results provide additional evidence on the ongoing cost and benefit debate of ICFR audits for small firms.

Regulators have expressed concerns that an emphasis on non-audit services (NAS) could distract from the audit function, even for clients with minimal NAS purchases. Motivated by this concern, we examine whether a greater emphasis on providing NAS to audit clients generally (i.e., not to a specific client) can distract from the audit function, thus reducing audit quality. We find evidence of an NAS distraction effect, where a greater emphasis on NAS at the audit office-level results in more client financial statement restatements, even after controlling for client-specific NAS. Further, the association exists among clients that purchase minimal NAS, suggesting that this association relates to distraction effects in addition to independence issues examined in prior research. This study should be of interest to audit firms, audit committees, and regulators because it provides new evidence regarding issues related to a business model that includes both audit and non-audit services.

We exploit a regulatory change to examine whether bank regulator strictness is affected when regulators no longer rely on external assurance. In the absence of external assurance, we find that banks report higher nonaccrual loans, higher troubled debt restructurings, and both a timelier loan loss provision and higher quality allowance for loan loss reserve. Further, regulators spend more days performing targeted bank examinations for banks affected by the regulatory change. We do not find evidence of operational deterioration, but rather the findings are consistent with increased regulator strictness over the reporting of problem assets, particularly during targeted examinations. Overall, our results suggest that regulators become stricter when they can no longer rely on the work of external auditors and that third-party assurance is an imperfect substitute for direct regulatory monitoring. Data Availability: Bank regulatory rating and examination dates are confidential and were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. All other data are available from the public sources cited in the text.