We examine the effect of institutional ownership on corporate disclosure policy using a regression discontinuity design. Using a novel dataset comprising every 8-K filing between 1996 and 2006, we find that positive shocks to institutional ownership around Russell index reconstitutions increase the quantity, form, and quality of disclosure. Compared with those at the bottom of the Russell 1000 index, firms at the top of the Russell 2000 index increase institutional ownership by 9.8%, and disclose 4.7% longer 8-K filings with 21.3% more embedded graphics. This incremental disclosure significantly increases the information content of 8-K filings for the market and for analysts.

We examine the effect of institutional ownership on corporate disclosure policy using a regression discontinuity design. Using a novel dataset comprising every 8-K filing between 1996 and 2006, we find that positive shocks to institutional ownership around Russell index reconstitutions increase the quantity, form, and quality of disclosure. Compared with those at the bottom of the Russell 1000 index, firms at the top of the Russell 2000 index increase institutional ownership by 9.8%, and disclose 4.7% longer 8-K filings with 21.3% more embedded graphics. This incremental disclosure significantly increases the information content of 8-K filings for the market and for analysts. Received July 1, 2015; accepted May 19, 2016 by Editor David Denis.

We examine residential relocation and opting out of the public school system in response to school choice lottery outcomes. We show that rising kindergartners and sixth graders who lose a school choice lottery are 6 percentage points more likely to exit the district or change neighborhood schools (20% to 30% increase) and make up 0.14 to 0.35 standard deviations in average school test scores between lottery assignment and attendance the following year. Using hedonic-based estimates of land prices, we estimate that lottery losers pay a 9% to 11% housing price premium for access to a school with a 1 standard deviation higher mean test score.

Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Search Site Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Citation Andrew Bird, Stephen A. Karolyi; Governance and Taxes: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity (Retracted). The Accounting Review 1 January 2017; 92 (1): 29–50. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51520 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentThe Accounting Review Search Advanced Search

Price clustering and optimal tick sizes have recently been topics of substantial public policy interest, and this paper presents evidence which is relevant to both debates. Around 98% of quoted and traded prices for LIFFE stock index derivatives are found to occur at even ticks. We report that clustering increases with volatility and transaction frequency, and decreases with trade size, and find that the proportion of odd ticks is significantly lower near the market open and higher near the close. Further, an inverse relationship is reported between bid–ask spreads and the number of odd ticks, and spreads cluster at even-tick values. This evidence of extreme price clustering is the first to be presented for financial derivatives. The results support both the price resolution and the negotiation hypotheses of price clustering.

Two well-known stylized facts on earnings management are that the earnings surprise distribution has a discontinuity at zero, and that positive earnings surprises are associated with positive abnormal returns. We link these two facts in a model of the earnings management decision in which the manager trades off the capital market benefits of meeting earnings benchmarks against the costs of manipulation. We develop a new structural methodology to estimate the model and uncover the unobserved cost function. The estimated model parameters yield the percentage of manipulating firms, magnitude of manipulation, noise in manipulation, and sufficient statistics to evaluate proxies for identifying firms suspected of manipulation. Finally, we use the Sarbanes–Oxley Act as a policy experiment and find that by increasing costs, the Act reduced equilibrium earnings management by 36%. This reduction occurred despite an increase in benefits, consistent with the market rationally becoming less skeptical of firms that just meet benchmarks.

ABSTRACT We examine the joint response to political uncertainty along two margins: changes in real activity and voluntary disclosure. We focus on within‐firm variation in exposure to ex ante competitive U.S. gubernatorial elections using data on preelection poll margins and firms’ state exposures. Despite real activity falling in the years leading up to a close election, we find that voluntary disclosure increases both in frequency and content, including mentions of risk in filings that reference states holding elections. Our tests use a decomposition of 8‐K filings into real activity and voluntary disclosure to address the endogenous complementarity between these two responses. These results hold when using alternative ex ante measures of political uncertainty based on term‐limited incumbents, historically competitive offices, or state legislature gridlock. Both effects of political uncertainty are stronger for firms in highly regulated industries and weaker for those least exposed to the local market, linking the real activity and disclosure responses to uncertainty.

Abstract We study whether and how publicizing internal information affects the value of financial markets to the real economy. By publicizing corporate filings, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) web platform reduces the cost of acquiring internal information for outsiders and so makes it relatively less attractive to gather external information. We find that the staggered introduction of EDGAR reduced the sensitivity of firm investment to prices, consistent with prices being less informative to managers due to the crowding out of external information gathering. This crowding out effect is stronger when outsiders’ incentives for gathering information are stronger and for firms that rely more on external information. Our findings suggest that policies designed to “level the playing field” by publicizing internal information can have significant unintended consequences by reducing the informativeness of prices for real decisions.

Abstract To mitigate holdup by an informed incumbent lender, a private borrower may publicly share information in order to increase lender competition. Despite proprietary costs, a subset of private borrowers voluntarily share private information in loan and credit underwriting agreements. These borrowers switch lenders at a 16% higher rate and receive lower loan financing costs. For private firms that go public, we analyze changes in the net benefits of information sharing and study the potential estimation bias from unobservable borrower quality. This setting corroborates our inference that voluntary information sharing reduces lender holdup and alleviates financial constraints for private firms. Received May 25, 2017; editorial decision August 8, 2018 by Editor David Denis.

We firmly believe that style-appropriate, investible benchmarks not only provide a more parsimonious way of describing manager performance, but also better aligns performance evaluation with the real world performance targets of fund managers’. It is against such benchmarks that managers should be judged. With this principle foremost in our approach, we use style-consistent benchmarks to determine whether any observed alpha produced by a sample of U.S. equity funds is due to skill or to luck. We find that different segments of the market, ranging from large-cap growth to small-cap value, exhibit different levels of skill and luck. Our results also show that the use of standard multi-factor models underestimates managerial ability and overstates the proportion of funds whose abnormal performance can be attributed to chance rather than to skill, when compared against the use of style-consistent practitioner benchmarks. We also find that a single factor performance evaluation model that uses Russell Style indices consistent with the style orientation of a fund and market practice provides a parsimonious way of accounting for fund performance. Finally, our findings should be of particular relevance in mutual fund markets where the risk factors commonly used in the academic literature to evaluate manager performance – SMB, B/M, MOM and others – are not readily available.