We study the role of shocks to parental income in determining the labor market outcomes of children entering the labor market. We find that a child whose parent loses a job prior to the child’s labor market entry is, on average, induced to work 9% more in the 3 years following labor market entry than a child whose parents lose a job after the child’s entry. This effect is concentrated on the extensive margin and decreases in magnitude over time. We find no evidence that these shocks affect the quality of the job that entrants find.

We study the welfare effects of enabling peer supply through Airbnb in the accommodation industry. We present a model of competition between flexible and dedicated sellers (peer hosts and hotels) who provide differentiated products. We estimate this model using data from major US cities and quantify the welfare effects of Airbnb on travelers, hosts, and hotels. The welfare gains are concentrated in specific locations (New York) and times (New Year’s Eve) when hotel capacity is constrained. This occurs because peer hosts are responsive to market conditions, expand supply as hotels fill up, and keep hotel prices down as a result.

Job search is a key choice variable in theories of labor markets but is difficult to measure directly. We develop a job search activity index based on Google search data, the Google Job Search Index (GJSI). We validate the GJSI with both survey- and web-based measures of job search. Unlike those measures, the GJSI is high frequency, geographically precise, and available in real time. We demonstrate the GJSI’s utility by using it to study the effects of unemployment insurance policy changes between 2008 and 2014. We find no evidence of an economically meaningful effect of these changes on aggregate search.

Default contribution rates for 401(k) pension plans powerfully influence choices. Potential causes include opt-out costs, procrastination, inattention, and psychological anchoring. Using realistically parameterized models, we show how the optimal default, the magnitude of the welfare effects, and the degree of normative ambiguity depend on the behavioral model, the scope of the choice domain deemed welfare-relevant, the use of penalties for passive choice, and other 401(k) plan features. While results are theory-specific, our analysis provides reasonably robust justifications for setting the default either at the highest contribution rate matched by the employer or—contrary to common wisdom—at zero.