Many Japanese firms reduced dependence on banks following financial deregulation in the 1980s. The financial architecture of Japanese firms after liberalization provides an opportunity to investigate the choice of financing with public bonds versus monitored bank loans. Examination of accounting and stock price data for a sample of Japanese firms in the late 1980s suggests that debt structure is related to variables that serve as proxies for agency costs of debt. In particular, we find that the proportion of bond debt is inversely related to growth opportunities, while the proportion of bank debt is positively related to growth opportunities.

In the first round of the Czech privatization scheme, the authorities set a uniform share price for all companies, creating a natural experiment for testing several hypotheses concerning the determinants of share demand. We find a positive relation between first-round share demand and later stock market prices, supporting use of share demand to measure relative share values. We find that share demand is related to proxies for agency costs and the expected costs of financial distress. Interestingly, share demand is directly related to the percentage of shares held by insiders, which is relevant for the debate in former Communist countries over whether privatization programs should restrict insider holdings.

Significant increases in the level of target leverage have been previously documented following unsuccessful takeover attempts. This increased leverage may signal managerial commitment to improved performance, suggesting that corporate performance and leverage should be positively related. If, however, the increased leverage leads to further managerial entrenchment, then corporate performance and leverage should be negatively related. In this paper, we reexamine both motivations for the observed increase in leverage. Furthermore, we argue that changes in the composition of debt are also important, besides changes in the level of leverage. In particular, bank debt has frequently been assigned a proactive, beneficial monitoring role in the literature. Besides confirming the increase in the level of leverage, we also document increases in bank debt surrounding cancelled takeovers. As a result, we find a more complex relation between corporate performance and debt use: Overall, the relation between corporate performance and leverage is negative, as predicted by a dominant entrenchment effect. However, increases in bank debt reduce the adverse effect of the increase in the level of leverage.

Prior literature routinely assumes symmetric cultural distance (CD) in a given country pair, suggesting an identical role for the home and host countries. However, if the absolute CD is perceived differently depending on the acquirer's home base, it may yield disparate effects in cross-border M&A (CB M&A) transactions. Consistently, we find that the relationship between CD and CB M&A premiums is not uniform, but varies by acquirer origin. While we find a strong negative association between CD and premiums when U.S. firms bid for foreign targets, no such negative association is observed when foreign bidders evaluate U.S. targets. Using traveler flows, student exchanges, and previous acquisitions as proxies for directional cross-cultural familiarity, we provide evidence that familiarity with the target's national culture is related to the magnitude of CD discount in a systematic way and thus explains the observed asymmetry. Our findings highlight the existence, as well as the source, of the asymmetric property in the relationship between CD and target premiums in CB M&A.

We find that firms behave consistently with how their CEOs behave personally in the context of leverage choices. Analyzing data on CEOs' leverage in their most recent primary home purchases, we find a positive, economically relevant, robust relation between corporate and personal leverage in the cross-section and when examining CEO turnovers. The results are consistent with an endogenous matching of CEOs to firms based on preferences, as well as with CEOs imprinting their personal preferences on the firms they manage, particularly when governance is weaker. Besides enhancing our understanding of the determinants of corporate capital structures, the broader contribution of the paper is to show that CEOs' personal behavior can, in part, explain corporate financial behavior of the firms they manage.

We examine how real investment decisions of firms are affected by their CEOs' career concerns. Relative to their older counterparts, younger CEOs are more likely to enter new lines of businesses and exit from existing ones. Younger CEOs undertake bolder expansions and divestments, which lead to significant increases and decreases in firm size, respectively. Younger CEOs also prefer to grow through acquisitions than de novo investments. However, such busier investment style of the younger CEOs appears not to hurt firm efficiency. Additional results also shed light on how CEO favoritism distorts capital allocation within firms.

We find, like [Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R.M., 1992. Contagion and competitive intra-industry effects of bankruptcy announcements: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 32(1), 45–60], that large firm bankruptcies generate a dominant contagion effect. A value-weighted portfolio of competitors' stocks experiences a significant loss of 0.56% in the three days centered around the Chapter 11 announcement. This represents an average loss of $3.32 for all the competitors combined for every dollar lost by the bankrupt firm. In addition, we find that small firm bankruptcies also generate a dominant contagion effect among smaller sized competitors; an equally-weighted portfolio of all competitors has a significant 0.12% drop. In a new approach to separate the contagion and competitive effects, we compare the stock price reactions of competitors who themselves subsequently file for bankruptcy in the next three years (candidates for contagion effect) with those who do not do so (candidates for competitive effect). As expected, candidates for contagion effect experience a significant, negative three-day stock price reaction of −4.68%. However, contrary to expectations, candidates for competitive effect also have a significant, negative return (−0.49%), suggesting that the competitive effect is weak at best since it is dominated by the contagion effect even in this sample. Other procedures to identify candidates for competitive effect generally yield similar findings. Finally, we analyze competitors' stock price reactions based on selected characteristics (e.g., industry concentration, and leverage), with similar results as before. One explanation for the failure to detect a competitive effect is that the impact may already have been incorporated in stock prices prior to the filing for Chapter 11. Consistent with this explanation, we find significant positive stock price reactions by competitor stocks for the hundred days prior to the bankruptcy announcement.