ABSTRACT We examine how subjectivity in performance measurement and reward systems (PMRS) is used to mitigate incentive contracting risks. Drawing on data from 38 interviews with supervisory and subordinate managers in four firms, we provide a more comprehensive explanation of the role of subjectivity in risk mitigation than is evident in the prior literature. We provide empirical evidence of the importance firms place on the use of subjectivity to mitigate the risk of incentive misalignment and employee sorting errors relative to its well-documented role in mitigating employee compensation risk. We find that incentive misalignment arising from unanticipated behavioral responses to performance measures is a particularly important risk, managed through subjective performance assessments. The extent of subjectivity we observe poses a significant risk of errors and bias. We observe that both vertical and horizontal information gathering and review by calibration panels are key strategies to mitigate the downside risk of subjectivity. JEL Classifications: M49; M55; M52; M51.

ABSTRACT Cross-border alliances expose firms to heightened risks, posing different governance and control challenges than domestic alliances. We examine the impact of differences in alliance partner countries' institutional environments. Analysis of survey data supports our contention that cross-border alliances involve a greater reliance on formal controls, particularly when firms collaborate with partners in countries with a weaker institutional environment. These relations exist regardless of governance structure (i.e., equity or non-equity alliance) that prior research considers a critical choice for addressing cross-border alliance risks. Additional analyses show that four subdimensions of institutional characteristics (voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) and one subdimension of formal controls (behavior controls) are the main drivers in the association between institutional distance and reliance on formal controls. These findings demonstrate the distinct impact of institutional environment as a country-level determinant of alliance control choices. Data Availability: Due to confidentiality agreements with respondents, the data cannot be released publicly. JEL Classifications: D23; D82; L22; M4.