Using a new dataset of UK-syndicated loans, we document a significant loan cost disadvantage incurred by privately held firms. For identification, we use the distance of a firm's headquarters to London's capital markets as a plausibly exogenous variation in corporate structure (i.e., public/private) choice. We analyze the channels of the loan cost disadvantage of being private by documenting the importance of: the higher costs of information production, the lower bargaining power, the differences in ownership structure, and the differences in secondary market trading. Interestingly, we find no evidence that lenders price expected future performance into the loan spread differential.

[Using a new dataset of UK-syndicated loans, we document a significant loan cost disadvantage incurred by privately held firms. For identification, we use the distance of a firm's headquarters to London's capital markets as a plausibly exogenous variation in corporate structure (i.e., public/private) choice. We analyze the channels of the loan cost disadvantage of being private by documenting the importance of: the higher costs of information production, the lower bargaining power, the differences in ownership structure, and the differences in secondary market trading. Interestingly, we find no evidence that lenders price expected future performance into the loan spread differential.]

We investigate whether the introduction of fixed-price U.S. federal deposit insurance in 1933 increased the risk-taking of banks over the succeeding period. We examine 60 financial institutions and find that banks and trusts in general became more risky after the introduction of deposit insurance. However, a subset of well-performing banks appears to have reduced their risk. Deposit insurance also reduced the incentives of depositors to discriminate between ex ante weaker and stronger banks thus reducing depositor discipline in return for greater banking system stability.

This paper is the first in the literature to examine the determinants of US credit card penalty fees. Many critics of credit card fees – including a number of US Senators – have argued that credit card penalty fees reflect banks’ market share. Using a unique data set we find that fees are increasing in customer risk which supports the position of defenders of penalty fees, such as banks. However, our finding that fees are increasing in a bank's market share is consistent with the concerns expressed by politicians and regulators. We also find card penalty fees are direct substitutes for card interest rates.

[We find that repeated borrowing from the same lender translates into a 10—17 bps lowering of loan spreads and that relationships are especially valuable when borrower transparency is low. These results hold using multiple approaches (propensity score matching, instrumental variables, and treatment effects model) that control for the endogeneity of relationships. We also provide a demarcation line between relationship and transactional lending. Spreads charged for relationship loans and nonrelationship loans are statistically identical if the borrower is in the largest 30% by asset size; has public rated debt; or is part of the S&P 500 index. Past relationships reduce collateral requirements and are also associated with obtaining larger loans. Our results imply that, even for firms that have multiple sources of outside financing, borrowing from a prior lender obtains better loan terms.]

This paper investigates an important contemporary issue relating to the involvement of hedge funds in the syndicated loan market. In particular, we investigate the potential conflicts of interest that arise when hedge funds make syndicated loans and take short positions in the equity of borrowing firms. We find evidence consistent with the short-selling of the equity of the hedge fund borrowers prior to public announcements of both loan originations and loan amendments. We also find that hedge funds are more likely to lend to highly leveraged, lower credit quality firms, where access to private information is potentially the most valuable and where trading on such information could lead to enhanced profits. Overall, our results have important implications for the current debate regarding regulating the hedge fund industry.

We find that repeated borrowing from the same lender translates into a 10–17 bps lowering of loan spreads and that relationships are especially valuable when borrower transparency is low. These results hold using multiple approaches (propensity score matching, instrumental variables, and treatment effects model) that control for the endogeneity of relationships. We also provide a demarcation line between relationship and transactional lending. Spreads charged for relationship loans and nonrelationship loans are statistically identical if the borrower is in the largest 30% by asset size; has public rated debt; or is part of the S&P 500 index. Past relationships reduce collateral requirements and are also associated with obtaining larger loans. Our results imply that, even for firms that have multiple sources of outside financing, borrowing from a prior lender obtains better loan terms.