[A lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank market is crucial for banks facing uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. This article studies the efficiency of the interbank market in allocating funds. We show that the central bank should lower the interbank rate when confronted with a crisis that causes a disparity in the liquidity held among banks. This suggests that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. We also show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs.]

The recent financial crisis has shown that short-term collateralized borrowing may be a highly unstable source of funds in times of stress. In this paper, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model and analyze under what conditions such instability can be a consequence of market-wide changes in expectations. We derive a liquidity constraint and a collateral constraint that determine whether such expectations-driven runs are possible and show that they depend crucially on the microstructure of particular funding markets that we examine in detail. This provides insights into the differences between the tri-party repo market and the bilateral repo market, which were both at the heart of the recent financial crisis.

We study two designs for a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM), a queuing arrangement used with an interbank settlement system. With a balance-reactive LSM, banks can set a balance threshold below which payments are not released from the queue, an action not possible with a receipt-reactive LSM. Payments that are costly to delay are settled earlier with a receipt reactive LSM. Payments that are not costly to delay may be queued with a balance reactive LSM but are always delayed with a receipt reactive LSM. We show that either system can provide higher welfare.

This paper uses new data to provide a comprehensive view of repo activity during the 2007 global financial crisis. We show that activity declined much more in the bilateral segment of the market than in the tri‐party segment. Surprisingly, a large share of the decline in activity is driven by repos backed by Treasury securities. Further, a disproportionate share of the decline in repo activity is connected to securities dealer's market‐making activity. In particular, the evidence suggests that at least part of the decline is not driven by clients pulling away from securities dealers because of counterparty credit concerns.

The recent financial crisis has shown that short-term collateralized borrowing may be a highly unstable source of funds in times of stress. In this paper, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model and analyze under what conditions such instability can be a consequence of market-wide changes in expectations. We derive a liquidity constraint and a collateral constraint that determine whether such expectations-driven runs are possible and show that they depend crucially on the microstructure of particular funding markets that we examine in detail. This provides insights into the differences between the tri-party repo market and the bilateral repo market, which were both at the heart of the recent financial crisis.

A lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank market is crucial for banks facing uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. This article studies the efficiency of the interbank market in allocating funds. We show that the central bank should lower the interbank rate when confronted with a crisis that causes a disparity in the liquidity held among banks. This suggests that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. We also show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs.

The repo market has been viewed as a potential source of financial instability since the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis, based in part on findings that margins increased sharply in a segment of this market. This paper provides evidence suggesting that there was no system‐wide run on repo. Using confidential data on tri‐party repo, a major segment of this market, we show that, the level of margins and the amount of funding were surprisingly stable for most borrowers during the crisis. However, we also document a sharp decline in the tri‐party repo funding of Lehman in September 2008.