According to the Washington Consensus, developing countries' growth would benefit from reductions in barriers to trade. However, the empirical basis for judging trade reforms is weak. Econometrics are mostly ad hoc, results are typically not judged against models, policies are poorly measured, and most studies are based on pre-1990 experience. We address these concerns by employing a model with capital and intermediate goods, compiling new disaggregated tariff measures, and employing treatment and control regression analysis with differences-in-differences. We find that a specific treatment, liberalizing tariffs on imported capital and intermediate goods, led to faster growth, consistent with the model.

In contemporary data, the measured factor content of trade is far smaller than its predicted magnitude in the pure Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek framework, the so-called 'missing trade' mystery. Authors wonder if this problem has been there from the beginning: that is, authors ask if the Heckscher-Ohlin theory was so much at odds with reality at its time of conception. Authors apply contemporary tests to historical data, focusing on the major trading zone that inspired the factor abundance theory, the Old and New Worlds of the pre-1914 'Greater Atlantic' economy. This places autor's analysis in a very different context than contemporary studies: an era with lower trade barriers, higher transport costs, a more skewed global distribution of the relevant factors (especially land), and comparably large productivity divergence. These conditions might seem more favorable to the theory, but the results are still very poor.

We examine the effect of regionalism on unilateral trade liberalization using industry-level data on applied most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs and bilateral preferences for ten Latin American countries from 1990 to 2001. We find that preferential tariff reduction in a given sector leads to a reduction in the external (MFN) tariff in that sector. External liberalization is greater if preferences are granted to important suppliers. However, these “complementarity effects” of preferential liberalization on external liberalization do not arise in customs unions. Overall, our results suggest that concerns about a negative effect of preferential liberalization on external trade liberalization are unfounded.