This paper finds evidence that daylight saving time changes influence the decision-making of investors when trading in firms targeted for mergers. We find that investors who face imbalances in their circadian cycle generate more positive abnormal stock returns upon the announcement of target firms. This result holds within a large number of robustness tests. Target firms also experience more pronounced stock return volatility in response to their merger announcements the first trading day after clock changes. Overall, these results seem to indicate that investors may overreact to available information when experiencing imbalances in their circadian cycle.

We introduce the significance of a direct sentiment proxy as an explanatory variable of bidder announcement returns. We argue that sentiment subconsciously influences investor perception of potential merger synergies and risks, and therefore relates to bidder abnormal returns. We proxy daily sentiment based on Facebook status updates across seventeen international markets and show that there is a positive relation between sentiment and bidder announcement returns. In line with behavioral literature stating that sentiment more heavily influences uninformed traders, this relation is more pronounced in acquisitions with a low percentage of blockholder ownership, acquisitions of US public targets, and acquisitions of large targets relative to the size of the bidders. Our study goes beyond the conventional sentiment and stock market returns literature, uncovering a significant relation between sentiment and firm-specific abnormal returns to acquiring companies.

This study examines the asset pricing implications of preferences over the higher moments of returns’ distributions. We show that in a market populated by risk-averse, prudent and temperate investors, firms whose returns exhibit negative coskewness or positive cokurtosis should yield higher premia relative to counterpart firms with positive coskewness and negative cokurtosis respectively. These theoretical predictions are empirically tested using a comprehensive dataset of shares listed on the London Stock Exchange during the period 1986–2008. Our empirical results confirm that coskewness and cokurtosis premia are genuinely priced in the UK market, over and above what covariance risk, size, value and momentum factors can explain. We also show that a theoretically motivated, higher co-moment asset pricing model has significant explanatory ability over the cross-section of coskewness and cokurtosis portfolio returns.

This paper introduces the concept of divergence of sentiment to the behavioral finance literature. We measure the distance between people with positive and negative sentiment on a daily basis for 20 countries by using data from status updates on Facebook. The prediction is that a higher divergence of sentiment leads to more diverging views on prospects and risks, and thus to more diverging views on the value of a stock. In line with this prediction, divergence of sentiment is positively related to trading volume. We further predict and find a positive relation between divergence of sentiment and stock price volatility. The observed relations are stronger when individual investors are more likely to trade. We compare the effect of our country-specific measures to a global measure of divergence of sentiment. We find that the separate effects of country-specific and global divergence measures depend on a country's level of market integration.

This paper studies the differences in the announcement effects of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) of commercial banks and non-banks, and explores the influence of bank regulation and the financial crisis on such differences. We find that abnormal stock returns on SEO announcements for US commercial banks are significantly higher than those of non-banks, consistent with the hypothesis that bank regulations reduce the likelihood that bank SEOs signal overpriced equity. The propensity score matching-based difference-in-difference analysis indicates that the differences in stock returns between banks and non-banks decreased during the 2007–2009 financial crisis period and increased after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.