This study investigates why newly listed firms become M&A targets shortly after their initial public offering (IPOs) from the perspective of product innovation. We find strong empirical evidence that IPOs with less established trademarks increase the likelihood of becoming IPO targets. We also find that the negative relation between established trademarks and the likelihood of becoming IPO targets is more pronounced in highly competitive industries and is primarily driven by the M&A supply side. IPOs with more established trademarks can fend themselves against the product market race as independent firms. They can meanwhile realize superior post-IPO financial as well as innovation performance. To acquire such firms, acquirers need to offer substantially higher takeover premiums. However, some empirical evidence suggests that less product innovation-intensive IPOs tend to deliberately seek potential acquirers to support their product market competing position and therefore are more likely to initiate an M&A deal shortly after going public.

This paper explores whether and how political connections affect the likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A deal for Chinese publicly listed, but privately-owned enterprises (POEs) and the resulting firm performance. In line with our proposed political connection trade-off theory, we find that POEs with politically connected top managers are more likely to complete a cross-border M&A deal than POEs with no such connections, but that this comes at the cost of negative announcement returns and subsequent lower accounting performance. These findings support the idea that politically connected top managers engage in “political empire building” behavior at the cost of shareholders' wealth.

This paper explores whether and how political connections affect the market for corporate bonds issued by privately owned enterprises (POEs) in China. We test two competing theories – the zero-default myth and the borrower channel theory – that offer alternative explanations for the effect of political connections on the likelihood of bond issuance, the costs of refinancing, the market reaction to a bond issue announcement, and the performance of the firm after the bond has been issued. Using a sample of Chinese POEs from 2007 to 2016, we show that – in line with the zero-default myth theory – politically connected POEs are more likely to issue corporate bonds as a debt financing instrument than their non-connected counterparts. They also achieve lower coupon rates (i.e., lower refinancing costs), despite exhibiting lower overall performance after bond issuance. We find that investors react positively to corporate bond-issuing announcements if the issuing firm is politically connected. At the same time, our research indicates that politically connected bond-issuing POEs in China have weaker corporate governance and a surprisingly higher default probability than non-connected issuers.

This paper examines how political connections shape media bias and contribute to regulatory noncompliance in China's capital markets. Using a large sample of news articles on publicly listed non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), we find that politically connected firms receive significantly more favorable media coverage than their unconnected peers. A difference-in-differences analysis exploiting a regulatory shock—China's Rule 18 anti-corruption regulation—that forced politically connected directors to resign confirms the link between political ties and biased reporting. Around corporate scandals, politically connected firms face softer media scrutiny, weakening reputational penalties. Critically, we show that this media shielding effect increases the likelihood of repeated regulatory violations. These findings highlight the social costs of the “scandal-covering” role of political connections, which not only distort the information environment but also undermine regulatory deterrence and market discipline.