In an article published earlier in this journal [4], we studied the term structure of interest fates in a dynamic context. Instead of focusing on the yield curve at a point in time, we investigated the joint movement of short and long-term interest rates through time. We compared the cyclical behavior of the ninety-day Treasury bill rate and the ten-year U.S. government bond rate by using cross-spectral analysis. The data used for the analysis were obtained from regression-fitted yield curves. These fitted yield curves enabled us to obtain the monthly yields of securities of prespecified term to maturity. The derivation was done in a precise manner which at the same time is in line with most of the previous term structure studies.

It has been observed that when the level of interest rates rises all rates increase, but short-term rates rise systematically more than longterm rates. Over time, therefore, short-term rates experience wider fluctuations than long-term rates. This behavior, however, does not provide any clue as to which interest rate leads the other over the cycle. Most research on term structure of interest rates has focused on the yield curve at a point in time; little has been done to investigate the joint movement of short- and long-term interest rates through time. In this study, we compare the cyclical behavior of short-term and long-term interest rates in the United States during the period 1954–1967. The relationship between the 90-day Treasury bill rate and the 10-year U. S. Government bond rate is analyzed by the cross-spectral method.

This paper analyzes the structure of loan commitment contracts and the interrelationships among their component parameters. Lenders offer borrowers a set of loan “packages,” from which the latter may choose that “package” found to be most appealing. Borrowers may “trade off” changes in any loan parameter in exchange for other adjustments. The borrower, at this time, may “purchase” a larger credit ration for a price. Supporting empirical evidence is presented.

This paper analyzes the structure of loan commitment contracts and the interrelationships among their component parameters. Lenders offer borrowers a set of loan “packages,” from which the latter may choose that “package” found to be most appealing. Borrowers may “trade off” changes in any loan parameter in exchange for other adjustments. The borrower, at this time, may “purchase” a larger credit ration for a price. Supporting empirical evidence is presented.