THIS PAPER DEMONSTRATES A NEW REVEALED PREFERENCE APPROACH TO VALUATING TIME. THE FULL-PRICE DEMAND FUNCTIONS, WHEREIN DEMAND DEPENDS UPON THE SUM OF MONEY PRICE AND TIME COST, MAY BE OBTAINED FROM NEOCLASSICAL DEMAND THEORY WITHOUT RESORTING TO THE USE OF LEISURE, OR THE CONSUMER PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS OF THE BECKER MODEL. THE RESTRICTIONS ON THESE DEMAND FUNCTIONS PROVIDE AN INDIRECT MEANS OF ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF TIME. IN THE EMPIRICAL SECTION, THE VALUE OF TIME IS ESTIMATED FROM AIR TRAVEL DATA AND IS DERIVED, VIA THE INDIRECT PROCEDURE DEVELOPED, FROM OTHER DEMAND STUDIES. /DOT/

The behavior of a monopoly is analyzed in the following setting. Search creates a stochastic stream of customers. Searchers observe the queue and leave if it is too long. Production is random. In the optimal solution, waiting time, effective demand, and the utilization of capacity are jointly determined. Product quality in the form of waiting time is endogenous to the model, and it is found that price or capacity changes affect both the quantity and the quality of output. If an equilibrium exists, there is excess capacity. Price equals marginal cost, but monopoly produces too little capacity and output unless profits are zero.

The behavior of a monopoly is analyzed in the following setting. Search creates a stochastic stream of customers. Searchers observe the queue and leave if it is too long. Production is random. In the optimal solution, waiting time, effective demand, and the utilization of capacity are jointly determined. Product quality in the form of waiting time is endogenous to the model, and it is found that price or capacity changes affect both the quantity and the quality of output. If an equilibrium exists, there is excess capacity. Price equals marginal cost, but monopoly produces too little capacity and output unless profits are zero.

Both the Averch-Johnson (A-J) model and the Chamberlin model fail to consider the value of excess capacity to consumers. Service industries, whether they are regulated or not, will usually have excess capacity in the Chamberlinian sense because this capacity conserves time for consumers. This paper examines a model of the taxi industry where allowance is made for capacity to affect the value or quality of the service through its effect on waiting time. The central issue is to determine equilibrium output, capacity, and the utilization of capacity when the market is organized as a franchised monopoly, through a medallion system, and when there is free entry, and to exhibit the relationship among these variables and prices, cost of capacity and output, and policies of the regulator. It is found that many of the characteristics of taxi markets that would appear to confirm the monopolistic-competition thesis arise because of the nature of regulation of these markets.

When land markets are incomplete, parcels can be scaled to make control compatible with use and to internalize externalities. The authors show that an arbitrage-proof equilibrium implies an increasing and strictly concave relationship between the value and size of land parcels. Undeveloped land sales in southern California strongly confirm the theoretical relationship. The authors find that zoning primarily restricts the conversion of land from agriculture to residential and industrial uses relative to the competitive equilibrium. The scale of land units is an effective private instrument for providing compatible land use even in the presence of strong zoning.

The nature of the relationship between land tenure and fertility in an important contemporary setting is examined. Examination of the institutional structure of the Mexican land tenure system reveals some features that could have a positive impact on fertility. The possible pronatalist bias of the system is identified and discussed and the hypothesis that the population in the land reform sector exhibits higher fertility than other comparable populations in Mexico is tested. Tests are performed over 2 data sets using various measures of fertility; results more or less uniformly reject the null hypothesis that the fertility of the land reform sector families does not differ from other families. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that the percentage of ejidatarios (people belonging to an agrarian community that has received and continues to hold land in accordance with the agrarian laws growing out of the Revolution of 1910; this structure embodies several possible pronatalist incentives because of attenuated property rights) in a given population affects both the number of children ever born to women and the stock of children per woman of prime bearing age. While this statistical evidence can be explained by many alternate hypotheses it does support an economic interpretation of the decision to bear children. The constant competition for better land within the ejido together with a desire to secure a legal renter or inheritor for the land may be factors that induce ejidatarios to have larger families than private farmers or paid agricultural workers. It is significant that the very rapid population growth in Mexico has coincided with extensive reallocations of land to the ejidos from the private sector.