Contract and search theories are integrated to provide a consistent explanation of contract formation, the intertemporal structure of labor markets, the absence of ex post market clearing, and thus of unemployment in a contractual setting. Self-fulfilling equilibria are described in which low-productivity firms lay off some workers, while high-productivity firms' recruitment (search) intensity and the resulting degree of interfirm mobility are endogenous. The effects of severance pay on layoffs and mobility are identified. Finally, the market economy is shown to generate too few layoffs whenever high-productivity firms recruit new hires: without recruitment, laidoff workers are immobile, and equilibrium is constrained efficient.

This paper describes the equilibrium wage distribution and unemployment rate when firms recruit (search for) employees. A model in which firms' inability to distinguish workers who refuse job offers increases their expected recruiting costs, is contrasted with one in which indistinguishable low-productivity workers decrease firms' expected gains from hiring. In both, work force heterogeneity enhances search uncertainty, firms recruit less intensively than otherwise, and so the equilibrium unemployment rate rises. Heterogeneity reflects searchers' incomplete knowledge of desirable trading partners' locations and will likely be a confounding influence and source of unemployment in large economies with imperfectly observable sector-specific shocks.

This paper describes a simple framework for evaluating the allocative performance of economies characterized by trading frictions and unemployment. This framework integrates the normative results of earlier Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides bilateral matching-bargaining models of trade coordination and price-setting, and consists of a set of general conditions for constrained Pareto efficient resource allocation that are applicable to conventional natural rate models. To illustrate, several conventional models of the labour market are reformulated as matching-bargaining problems and analyzed using this framework.

This paper provides a complete characterization of the welfare economics of employment contracts when workers are immobile in the ex post period. Necessary and sufficient conditions for constrained Pareto optimality are derived for economies with incomplete risk markets, two consumption goods and random production technologies in which: (a) workers can/cannot observe realizations of their employers ' revenue function (symmetric vs. asymmetric information), and in which; (b) employment contracts allow/preclude contingent wages and/or employment levels (flexible vs. rigid contracts). This taxonomic approach serves to identify the welfare implications of exogenous and endogenous contractual rigidities, and to isolate a class of externalities that is unique to economies with asymmetric information. The latter market failure is also present with "indexed " contracts when workers alone can observe realizations of their consumption goods prices (another form of asymmetric information). 1.

Recent analyses of unemployment-vacancy series suggest that aggregate shocks, rather than sectoral shocks, are the primary factors responsible for unemployment fluctuations. This inference follows from two widely held beliefs: sectoral shocks induce only positive unemployment-vacancy comovements, while negative comovements are necessarily the result of aggregate demand shocks. This paper describes an equilibrium matching model that identifies plausible circumstances in which neither assumption is correct, thus suggesting that unemployment-vacancy data are inconclusive. Interestingly, this model's novel results are due to standard features in the contracting literature: firms experience relative price shocks and negotiate contracts that prescribe temporary layoffs.

Recent analyses of unemployment--vacancy series suggest that aggregate shocks, rather than sectoral shocks, are the primary factors responsible for unemployment fluctuations. This inference follows from two widely held beliefs: sectoral shocks induce only positive unemployment--vacancy comovements, while negative comovements are necessarily the result of aggregate demand shocks. This paper describes an equilibrium matching model that identifies plausible circumstances in which neither assumption is correct, thus suggesting that unemployment--vacancy data are inconclusive. Interestingly, this model's novel results are due to standard features in the contracting literature: firms experience relative price shocks and negotiate contracts that prescribe temporary layoffs.

This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model in which unemployed workers search for jobs and vacant firms search for employees. Formally, I develop a two-sector, constrained efficient version of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching model of trade coordination. This approach to modeling factor market search appears promising since its algebraic development parallels Jones's treatment of the two-sector model of production, and the latter framework underlies most applied general equilibrium analyses. Some illustrative short-run and steady-state results are presented concerning the behavior of open and closed economies that exhibit unemployment and vacancies.

This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model in which unemployed workers search for jobs and vacant firms search for employees. Formally, I develop a two-sector, constrained efficient version of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching model of trade coordination. This approach to modeling factor market search appears promising since its algebraic development parallels Jones's treatment of the two-sector model of production, and the latter framework underlies most applied general equilibrium analyses. Some illustrative short-run and steady-state results are presented concerning the behavior of open and closed economies that exhibit unemployment and vacancies.

A hedonic analysis of principal-agent employment contracts is developed in which workers and employers exchange labor services and contractual payment patterns. Within this framework, tests of alternative hypotheses are formulated and applied to contract data from a unique household-level survey of economic activity in rural China in 1935. The results indicate that credit market constraints motivated workers' and employers' contract choices, that shirking by workers rather than by employers was the dominant incentive issue, that reputational concerns rather than threats of termination were the key worker-disciplining device, and, finally, that the contract's third party acted as an enforcement device rather than as a matchmaker. Subject to the availability of matched agent-principal data, this structural approach to modeling agency relationships can also be used in contemporary settings.

A hedonic analysis of principal-agent employment contracts is developed in which workers and employers exchange labor services and contractual payment patterns. Within this framework, tests of alternative hypotheses are formulated and applied to contract data from a unique household-level survey of economic activity in rural China in 1935. The results indicate that credit market constraints motivated workers' and employers' contract choices, that shirking by workers rather than by employers was the dominant incentive issue, that reputational concerns rather than threats of termination were the key worker-disciplining device, and, finally, that the contract's third party acted as an enforcement device rather than as a matchmaker. Subject to the availability of matched agent-principal data, this structural approach to modeling agency relationships can also be used in contemporary settings.