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What matters more in board independence? Form or substance: Evidence from influential CEO-directors

Journal of Corporate Finance 2021 71, 102099
We exploit heterogeneities among CEO-directors and find that influential CEO-directors (ICDs) provide value through advising and monitoring. To expansively capture their relative influence, we identify CEO-directors who command more pay than the appointing firm's CEO. We find ICDs are more (less) likely to serve on the compensation (audit) committee. ICDs serve on more board seats and benefit more by serving on these seats. ICDs improve the performance of their appointing firm by increasing CEO pay-performance sensitivities and by helping with R&D and M&A activities. Alternatively, uninfluential CEO-directors are largely inconsequential or even detrimental to the appointing firm.

Corporate opacity and effectiveness of independent female directors

Journal of Corporate Finance 2021 69, 102007
Research shows female directors are associated with proxies for improved monitoring, yet finds mixed results as to their effect on firm performance. Hypothesizing that their performance impact depends on the firms' information environment, we find that independent female directors have a negative (positive) effect on performance in opaque (transparent) firms, an effect which is incremental to that of independent male directors. We then explore the channels which drive this finding. The standard measure of the information environment considers opacity from the view of external parties such as analysts and investors. However, independent directors have greater access to information than external parties. Consequently, we investigate whether additional data sources, if they exist, mitigate the impact of “external” opacity on the effect of independent female directors on firm performance. We find that when independent female directors have greater access to information either from sources inside, e.g., an independent board chair, or outside, e.g., a large network, the firm, their negative effect on performance in opaque firms dissipates. Investigating their positive impact in transparent firms, we find that independent female directors decrease both discretionary accruals and the likelihood of an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement release.

Are US founding families expropriators or stewards? Evidence from quasi-natural experiment

Journal of Corporate Finance 2021 69, 101987
We use board structure changes brought by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX; 2002) and subsequent listing standards as a natural experiment to investigate if founding families are expropriators or stewards of shareholder value. We hypothesize gain in a firm's value post-SOX if founding families are expropriators and a value loss if they are stewards. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that family firms that did not meet the requirements of SOX-related, board independence provisions before 2002, suffered significant value loss post-SOX. Our results favor the steward role for founding families.