March 01 2019 Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Content Explorer Asim I. Khwaja, Asim I. Khwaja Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Kunal Mangal Kunal Mangal Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Asim I. Khwaja Kunal Mangal Online Issn: 1530-9142 Print Issn: 0034-6535 © 2019 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2019The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Review of Economics and Statistics (2019) 101 (1): i–iii. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_e_00816 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Asim I. Khwaja, Kunal Mangal; Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Content Explorer. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2019; 101 (1): i–iii. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_e_00816 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsThe Review of Economics and Statistics Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2019 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2019The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

We examine the impact of liquidity shocks by exploiting cross-bank liquidity variation induced by unanticipated nuclear tests in Pakistan. We show that for the same firm borrowing from two different banks, its loan from the bank experiencing a 1 percent larger decline in liquidity drops by an additional 0.6 percent. While banks pass their liquidity shocks on to firms, large firms—particularly those with strong business or political ties—completely compensate this loss by additional borrowing through the credit market. Small firms are unable to do so and face large drops in overall borrowing and increased financial distress.

[We exploit an unexpected inflow of liquidity in an emerging market to study how capital is intermediated to firms. We find that backward-looking credit limit constraints imposed by banks make it difficult for firms to borrow, despite readily available bank liquidity, healthy aggregate demand, and a sharply falling cost of capital. The resulting aggregate failure to extend and retain capital in the economy suggests that agency costs that force banks to rely on sticky balance-sheet-based credit limits prevent emerging economies from effectively intermediating capital.]

Performance pay for tax collectors has the potential to raise revenues, but might come at a cost if it increases the bargaining power of tax collectors vis-à-vis taxpayers. We report the first large-scale field experiment on these issues, where we experimentally allocated 482 property tax units in Punjab, Pakistan, into one of three performance pay schemes or a control. After two years, incentivized units had 9.4 log points higher revenue than controls, which translates to a 46% higher growth rate. The scheme that rewarded purely on revenue did best, increasing revenue by 12.9 log points (64% higher growth rate), with little penalty for customer satisfaction and assessment accuracy compared to the two other schemes that explicitly also rewarded these dimensions. The revenue gains accrue from a small number of properties becoming taxed at their true value, which is substantially more than they had been taxed at previously. The majority of properties in incentivized areas in fact pay no more taxes, but instead report higher bribes. The results are consistent with a collusive setting in which performance pay increases collectors’ bargaining power over taxpayers, who have to either pay higher bribes to avoid being reassessed or pay substantially higher taxes if collusion breaks down.

October 01 2018 Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Content Asim I. Khwaja, Asim I. Khwaja Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Kunal Mangal Kunal Mangal Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Asim I. Khwaja Kunal Mangal Online Issn: 1530-9142 Print Issn: 0034-6535 © 2018 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Review of Economics and Statistics (2018) 100 (4): i–vi. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_e_00766 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Asim I. Khwaja, Kunal Mangal; Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Content. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2018; 100 (4): i–vi. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_e_00766 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsThe Review of Economics and Statistics Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2018 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

July 01 2018 Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Authorship Asim I. Khwaja, Asim I. Khwaja Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Kunal Mangal Kunal Mangal Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Asim I. Khwaja Kunal Mangal Online Issn: 1530-9142 Print Issn: 0034-6535 © 2018 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018 The Review of Economics and Statistics (2018) 100 (3): i–v. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_e_00743 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Asim I. Khwaja, Kunal Mangal; Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Authorship. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2018; 100 (3): i–v. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_e_00743 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsThe Review of Economics and Statistics Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2018 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

May 01 2018 Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: A Counting Exercise Asim I. Khwaja, Asim I. Khwaja Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Kunal Mangal Kunal Mangal Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Asim I. Khwaja Kunal Mangal Online Issn: 1530-9142 Print Issn: 0034-6535 © 2018 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Review of Economics and Statistics (2018) 100 (2): i–v. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_e_00742 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Asim I. Khwaja, Kunal Mangal; Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: A Counting Exercise. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2018; 100 (2): i–v. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_e_00742 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsThe Review of Economics and Statistics Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2018 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30–41 percent. Inspectors whom our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance.

We exploit an unexpected inflow of liquidity in an emerging market to study how capital is intermediated to firms. We find that backward-looking credit limit constraints imposed by banks make it difficult for firms to borrow, despite readily available bank liquidity, healthy aggregate demand, and a sharply falling cost of capital. The resulting aggregate failure to extend and retain capital in the economy suggests that agency costs that force banks to rely on sticky balance-sheet-based credit limits prevent emerging economies from effectively intermediating capital.

We study the impact of providing school report cards with test scores on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers. A randomly selected half of our sample villages (markets) received report cards. This increased test scores by 0.11 standard deviations, decreased private school fees by 17 percent, and increased primary enrollment by 4.5 percent. Heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school test scores is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information. Information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers, and improves market efficiency and child welfare through higher test scores, higher enrollment, and lower fees.