This paper examines a large, randomly chosen, sample of bond indentures focusing on the constraints they set on dividend payments that have the potential to transfer wealth from the bondholders (i.e., payments which are financed by a new debt issue or reduced investment). The nature of these restrictions support the hypothesis that bond convenants are structured to control the conflict of interest between stockholders and bondholders. Further, the empirical evidence suggests that these constraints are not binding — i.e., stockholders do not pay themselves as much dividends as they are allowed to. Explanations of this puzzling empirical regularity are suggested.

Past studies have documented an ex‐dividend day price drop which is less than the dividend per share and positively correlated with the corresponding dividend yield. In contrast to prior work, we show that, without additional information, the marginal tax rates cannot be inferred from this phenomenon which is, therefore, not necessarily the result of a tax induced clientele effect. Despite adjustments for potential biases in earlier work, however, the correlation between the ex‐dividend relative price drop and the dividend yield is still positive which is consistent with a tax effect and a tax induced clientele effect.

Past studies have documented an ex-dividend day price drop which is less than the dividend per share and positively correlated with the corresponding dividend yield. In contrast to prior work, we show that, without additional information, the marginal tax rates cannot be inferred from this phenomenon which is, therefore, not necessarily the result of a tax induced clientele effect. Despite adjustments for potential biases in earlier work, however, the correlation between the ex-dividend relative price drop and the dividend yield is still positive which is consistent with a tax effect and a tax induced clientele effect.