We study whether shocks to the supply of capital affect bond covenant structures using the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. and the subsequent regulatory changes as an exogenous contraction in the supply of speculative-grade credit around 1989. We find that speculative-grade firms increase their covenant use significantly more than the investment-grade firms in the post-1989 period. This result is robust to using alternative control groups such as using only the BBB-rated firms, unrated firms, and employing matched sample analysis. Consistent with a supply effect, the increase in covenant use is higher for firms with high costs of switching to alternative sources of funds and high dependence on external finance. Overall, our results suggest that shifts in credit supply affect not only the debt amounts but also the bond covenant structures. Even contracting terms of firms with access to public debt markets are not immune to fluctuations in the supply of capital.

We investigate the effect of creditor rights on the probability of becoming a takeover target by constructing firm-level bond covenant indices. Our primary result is that the more restrictive covenants a firm has, the more likely it is to become the target of an acquisition. This finding is robust to the exclusion of merger-related event-risk covenants which have the opposite impact and appear to reduce takeover likelihood. Furthermore, this effect is not driven by financially distressed firms and rather contained in small, profitable, financially healthy firms with high growth opportunities and low cash holdings. We also find that a higher target covenant index leads to a significant decrease (increase) in target (acquirer) abnormal returns around acquisition announcements and tilts merger gains towards the acquirer, suggesting the presence of a ‘covenant discount’ for potential target firms. Overall, our results are consistent with covenants creating key frictions, and in turn, making firms viable targets for acquirers with possibly deep pockets.