Understanding both the dynamics of volatility and the shape of the distribution of returns conditional on the volatility state is important for many financial applications. A simple single-factor stochastic volatility model appears to be sufficient to capture most of the dynamics. It is the shape of the conditional distribution that is the problem. This paper examines the idea of modeling this distribution as a discrete mixture of normals. The flexibility of this class of distributions provides a transparent look into the tails of the returns distribution. Model diagnostics suggest that the model, SV-mix, does a good job of capturing the salient features of the data. In a direct comparison against several affine-jump models, SV-mix is strongly preferred by Akaike and Schwarz information criteria.

Abstract I study the dynamics of investor cash flows in socially responsible mutual funds. Consistent with anecdotal evidence of loyalty, the monthly volatility of investor cash flows is lower in socially responsible funds than in conventional funds. I find strong evidence that cash flows into socially responsible funds are more sensitive to lagged positive returns than cash flows into conventional funds, and weaker evidence that cash outflows from socially responsible funds are less sensitive to lagged negative returns. These results indicate that investors derive utility from the socially responsible attribute, especially when returns are positive.

We study the economics of employment relationships in large law firms. Our point of departure is the “property‐rights” approach that emphasizes the centrality of ownership’s legal rights to control significant nonhuman assets of the enterprise. From this perspective, law firms are an interesting object of study because the key asset in these firms is knowledge, particularly knowledge of the needs and interests of clients. We argue that two distinctive organizational features of law firms—the use of “up‐or‐out” promotion contests and the practice of having winners become residual claimants in the firm—emerge naturally in this setting.

Considerable debate exists about what analyst experience measures and whether analysts learn from their experiences. Extant research has argued that once innate ability is considered, analysts’ general and firm-specific experiences are not relevant to understanding their forecasting performance. We argue that measures of experience need to be expanded to also include task-specific experience. Our results reveal that analysts’ forecast accuracy is associated with both their innate ability and task-specific experience. In addition, we find that forecast accuracy and task-specific experience are most highly correlated for those analysts who survive the longest and, thus, presumably have the greatest innate abilities.

I analyze a new set of data on Korean-American adoptees who were quasi-randomly assigned to adoptive families. I find large effects on adoptees ' education, income and health from assignment to parents with more education and assignment to smaller families. Parental education and family size are significantly more correlated with adoptee outcomes than are parental income or neighborhood characteristics. Outcomes such as drinking, smoking, and the selectivity of college attended are more determined by nurture than is educational attainment. Using the standard behavioral genetics variance decomposition, I find that shared family environment explains fourteen percent of the variation in educational attainment, thirty five percent of the variation in college selectivity, and thirty three percent of the variation in drinking behavior.

[We examine the theoretical predictions that link acquirer returns to diversity of opinion and information asymmetry. Theory suggests that acquirer abnormal returns should be negatively related to information asymmetry and diversity-of-opinion proxies for equity offers but not cash offers. We find that this is the case and that, more strikingly, there is no difference in abnormal returns between cash offers for public firms, equity offers for public firms, and equity offers for private firms after controlling for one of these proxies, idiosyncratic volatility.]

[We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanisms on bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impact of shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders) on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholder control is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firm is exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence of shareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differences in takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points. Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associated with strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bond covenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interests diverge.]

We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanisms on bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impact of shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders) on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholder control is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firm is exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence of shareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differences in takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points. Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associated with strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bond covenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interests diverge.

This paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative elections. In the model, districting matters because it determines the seat-vote curve, which describes the relationship between seats and votes. The paper first characterizes the optimal seat-vote curve and shows that, under a weak condition, there exist districtings that generate this ideal relationship. The paper then develops an empirical methodology for computing seat-vote curves and measuring the welfare gains from implementing optimal districting. This is applied to analyze the districting plans used to elect U.S. state legislators during the 1990s.

We implement an earnings-based fundamental valuation model to test the impact of market timing on the firm's method of funding the financing deficit. We argue that our valuation metric provides a superior measure of equity misvaluation because it avoids multiple interpretation problems faced by the market-to-book ratio. It also eliminates the need to infer market timing based on the actions of corporate insiders or other indirect measures. We find a strong positive relation between the degree to which a firm is overvalued and the proportion of the firm's financing deficit that is funded with equity. This result is found cross-sectionally and through time and is robust to firm size, and other variables known to impact capital structure. We find evidence that overvaluation in the 1990s led to equity being increasingly preferred over debt. For a broad set of firms, market timing explains a significant portion of the variation in the type of security used to fund the financing deficit.