Abstract Research suggests that the standard model used to detect opportunistic shifting of core expenses to special items is potentially biased. Such bias has been attributed to the use of accruals, including special item related accruals, as a control for the impact of performance on core earnings in this model. This paper provides an improved classification shifting model which both tests for such accruals-related bias and controls for other sources of error in the measurement of shifting. The paper also modifies conventional market rationality tests in accounting research to examine new dimensions of rationality in relation to measurement and valuation of shifting. The main empirical findings are as follows. First, the improved classification shifting model provides strong evidence of shifting and rejects the hypothesis that inclusion of accruals in the model causes bias. Second, estimates of shifted core expenses generated by the improved model exhibit forecasting properties of shifted earnings. Third, rationality test results are broadly consistent with rationality in relation to shifted core expenses but indicate possible partial (ir)rationality in relation to adjusted special items (i.e., special items excluding shifted core expenses). Further analysis of the latter findings, however, suggests they are more likely related to risk than irrationality. Overall, the paper contributes to improved measurement of shifting and highlights the importance of considering rational expectations when examining stock returns associated with shifting.

Financial institutions, especially in Europe, hold a disproportionate amount of domestic sovereign debt. We examine the extent to which this home bias leads to capital misallocation in a real business cycle model with imperfect information and fiscal stress. We assume banks can hold sovereign debt according to a zero-risk weight policy and contrast this scenario to one in which banks weight the sovereign debt according to default probabilities. Banks are assumed to miscalculate the probability of a disaster state due to moral hazard and imperfect monitoring. This distortion pushes the economy away from the first-best allocation. We show that the zero risk weight policy exacerbates these distortions while a non-zero risk-weight improves allocations. The welfare costs associated with zero-risk weight policies are large. Households are willing to give up 3.2 percent of their consumption to move to the first-best allocation, whereas in the economy with non-zero risk-weights households are willing to give up only 1.2 percent of their consumption to move to the first-best allocation.

Abstract We estimate the impact of social assistance on youth employment in Denmark, 2000 to 2006. For childless unmarried individuals, maximum welfare payments increased by 55% at age 25. Using administrative panel data, we find a significant disincentive effect among the low-skilled only, for whom employment fell by 2% to 3% and benefit take-up increased by 10% to 14%. Two-thirds of the effect is attributable to transitions from work to welfare and one-third to reduced labor market entry. Heterogeneous estimates along the earnings distribution show that employment responses are concentrated at very low earnings. We find no evidence of an age discontinuity in criminal activities.

Abstract I show that an alignment in partisan affiliation, between a firm’s management and the president, is associated with higher levels of investment. Using insider trading data, I find that managers become more optimistic about their companies’ prospects when their preferred party is in power. This optimism-driven increase in investment is amplified by herding and associated with both lower profitability and stock returns. Overall, managers’ political beliefs produce heterogeneous expectations about future cash flows and distort investment decisions.

Abstract We examine whether the change in earnings announcement textual tone, aggregated across individual publicly traded firms, helps predict gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The literature finds that changes in aggregate accounting earnings do help predict GDP growth, but only when aggregate earnings changes are negative. Because conservative accounting rules limit managers' ability to communicate positive news promptly, we examine the tone of quarterly corporate earnings announcements as a possible source of timely positive information provided by firms. We find that the change in aggregate tone in the earnings announcements from the same quarter in the previous year predicts one‐quarter‐ahead GDP growth, but only when the change is positive. Our study contributes to the literature by investigating the relation between aggregate corporate disclosure tone and macroeconomic outcomes.

The present study investigates the impact of a target entity’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) credentials, board diversity, and stock return synchronicity on analyst coverage decisions. Based on more than 33,000 stock recommendations on UK listed companies, we significantly deepen and extend the relevant literature (Kumar, 2010; Li et al, 2013; and Li et al., 2024) in several important ways. We find female analysts are more likely than male analysts to impound CSR information into stock coverage decisions for entities with intermediate recommendations. For firms with more extreme economic prospects. i.e., at strong buy and sell levels, the positive effect of CSR performance on female analyst coverage weakens. After controlling for the CSR characteristics of a stock, results suggest female analysts are more likely to cover firms with gender-inclusive boards. Results accord with a narrative emphasizing female analysts’ weaker access to firms with less gender-inclusive boards. Our account adds new context and application to the emerging corporate finance literature on gender-based homophily. Finally, we report limited difference in the stock return synchronicity of firms covered by male and female analysts.

Abstract Firms allocate significant amounts of common costs, and these allocations have implications for performance evaluation and remuneration. Non‐insulating cost allocations distribute costs based on same‐period relative performance, creating a contemporaneous interdependence between managers that in turn adds uncertainty to the link between effort and performance. In contrast, insulating cost allocations are independent of relative performance during the period and can thus be determined with greater certainty ex ante. In an experiment, we predict and find that managers' effortful performance in a stable production environment—where the pre‐allocation return for effort is constant—is higher when costs are allocated via an insulating allocation compared to when costs are allocated via a non‐insulating allocation. We further find that in an unstable production environment—where the pre‐allocation return for effort can vary from period to period—there are no differences in performance between the allocation methods when managers face a lower return for effort. Conversely, when managers face a higher return for effort in this environment, performance is greater when costs are allocated via an insulating allocation. Taken together, overall performance in the unstable production environment is greater when managers work under insulating cost allocations, suggesting the net effects of cost allocation methods are similar in each type of production environment. As such, our study identifies an important cost—lower effortful performance—of using non‐insulating methods to allocate common costs.

In an environment where concentrated share ownership is the norm, we ask whether Majority-of-the-Minority (MoM) votes curb controlling shareholder overreach and investment inefficiency. We consider MoM votes on controller-based related party transactions in China. Such votes give minority parties potential veto power. We report strong association between shareholder disapprovals on controller-based investment related MoM proposals and the underlying entity's investment plans. This association is robust to a battery of tests, including assessment of pre-vote consultation between minority and controlling shareholders and an exogenous regulatory shock. We also report increased likelihood of informal securities enforcements in the year following MoM shareholder disapproval.

We provide the first evidence of systematic bias among an emerging type of credit rating agency that relies on subscriptions from institutional clients as its primary source of revenue. Using data from Egan-Jones Ratings Company (EJR), a representative subscriber-paid rating agency, we show that EJR issues more optimistically biased credit ratings, less timely downgrades, and less accurate ratings for firms held by more EJR clients. Our evidence is consistent with EJR optimistically biasing its ratings to bolster subscriber revenue, which allows institutional clients to invest in riskier bonds with higher expected returns. Taken together, our findings suggest that the emergence of subscriber-paid rating agencies as an alternative to more traditional issuer-paid agencies is unlikely to resolve problems arising from conflicts of interest but rather alter the nature of these conflicts in the ratings process.

We use unique features of the private credit market to examine if and how currency risk impacts firms' financing and whether currency risk is a priced systematic risk at the firm level. We find that currency exposure has a large impact on loan spreads. Decomposing loan spreads, we find that exposure increases the expected default loss premium and that internationalization, growth opportunities, and relationship intensify exposure's impact. Further, exposure exacerbates firms' financing risk by increasing the need for collateral, reducing loan maturity, inducing monitoring and covenant intensity, and influencing syndicate structure. However, exposure does not affect the expected return premium in loan spreads; hence, currency risk does not appear priced in the classical sense and, therefore, should not affect the “true” cost of debt. Our findings imply that while managers should be concerned about exposure's impact on their access to, and terms of, bank financing, they should not adjust hurdle rates on account of exposure when assessing investment projects.