Using survey data on secured funding arrangements provided by broker–dealers for their clients—a class of contracts that includes bilateral repo—we document that financing rates, collateral haircuts, lending maturities, and position limits move strongly together over time and across asset classes. Liquidity of the underlying securities, as opposed to their volatility or credit risk, is the main driver of this behavior, with dealer balance-sheet constraints also playing a role in the funding of less-liquid security types. A simple model of dealer–client interaction rationalizes these findings. Instrumenting with changes in market conventions, we find that funding conditions had little effect on cash securities markets between 2011 and 2019, but the tightening of terms during the market stress of early 2020 likely impaired liquidity and reduced asset returns to some degree.

This review of liquidity traps unifies three landmark economic downturns—the US Great Depression, the Great Recession, and Japan’s Long Recession—into a single analytical framework. We examine various forces that drive natural interest rates negative: temporarily (such as banking crises and debt overhangs) or permanently (such as demographic shifts and inequality). When policy rates hit the zero lower bound, conventional monetary tools lose traction. Under a standard monetary policy regime, counterintuitive paradoxes emerge: Greater price flexibility deepens recessions, and positive supply shocks become contractionary. We show how policy effects—including the size of fiscal multipliers, forward guidance, and these paradoxes—depend critically on the monetary-fiscal regime and on central bank credibility. The paper explains how regime changes, such as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1933 abandonment of the gold standard and balanced-budget dogmas, successfully reversed deep slumps by credibly shifting expectations. We examine whether secular-stagnation forces are likely to assert themselves in the coming decades.(JEL E32, E42, E43, E52, E62, G01, G21)

How susceptible to contagion are bank deposits associated with financial inclusion? To assess this susceptibility, we analyze the behavior of deposits around three significant events of bank failure in the Philippines. We conduct the event studies with the advantage of a unique dataset that disaggregates deposits by size at the town level. We show that both small and large deposits are withdrawn up to 4–5 quarters before the bank’s closure. We take advantage of this distinction between small and large deposits to test for contagion. Applying difference-in-difference regressions, we find evidence of contagion: the closure of a large bank leads to withdrawals at banks in neighboring towns by depositors both large and small. This is the case for two of the three events, and when the data is taken collectively. That there is a market for information affects deposit insurance as a safety net for depositors and as a disciplining tool for banks. There are also liquidity considerations that banks need to consider. In any case, we consistently find the behavior of small depositors to be no different from that of large depositors. Hence, if financial inclusion is about access to bank deposits, it is not likely to heighten systemic risks nor mitigate them.

Ross B. Emmett of Arizona State University reviews “Just Price in the Markets: A History” by Charles R. Geisst. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Traces the historical development of price theory, focusing on debates about the role of equity and morals in society from the time of Aristotle to the emergence of the law of one price.”

The Dodd-Frank Act expands bank managers’ reporting requirements to federal agencies, particularly relating to banks’ financial losses should common market and macroeconomic shocks occur. To comply with this regulation, bank managers have engaged in consulting arrangements (referred to as regulatory consulting). We examine the financial reporting quality implications associated with hiring external auditors for these services. We find banks with auditor-provided regulatory consulting, relative to banks without, have higher financial reporting quality as measured by loan loss provision validity. Consistent with knowledge spillover benefits accruing to financial audit teams, we find more pronounced effects in the fourth versus interim quarters and more frequent income-reducing Y9-C restatements. We also find auditor responsiveness to PCAOB inspections improves the effectiveness of regulatory consulting. Overall, our results suggest regulatory consulting improves the audits of estimates in judgmental financial statement accounts, despite regulatory concerns that these services may impair auditor independence.

The change in the cost of capital that results from a divestiture strategy can be closely approximated by a simple function of three parameters: (1) the fraction of socially conscious capital, (2) the fraction of targeted firms in the economy and (3) the return correlation between the targeted firms and the rest of the stock market. When calibrated to current data, we demonstrate that the impact on the cost of capital is too small to meaningfully affect real investment decisions. We then derive the conditions that would be required for the strategy to have a meaningful impact. We empirically corroborate our theoretical results by studying firm changes in ESG status and are unable to detect an impact of ESG divestiture strategies on the cost of capital of treated firms. Our results suggest that to have impact, instead of divesting, socially conscious investors should invest and exercise their rights of control to change corporate policy.

Government debt can be rolled over forever without primary surpluses in some stochastic economies, including some economies that are dynamically efficient. In an overlapping‐generations model with constant growth rate, g , of labor‐augmenting productivity, and with shocks to the durability of capital, we show that along a balanced growth path, the maximum sustainable ratio of bonds to capital is attained when the risk‐free interest rate, r f , equals g . Furthermore, this maximal ratio maximizes utility per capita along a balanced growth path and ensures that the economy is dynamically efficient.

We consider a model in which a security issuer can manipulate information observed by a credit rating agency (CRA). We show that stricter screening by the CRA can sometimes lead to increased manipulation by the issuer. Accounting for the issuer’s behavior pulls optimal CRA screening toward the extremes of laxness or stringency. Surprisingly, an improvement in prior asset quality can result in more rating errors. In a two-period version of the model, stricter screening can result in more short-run rating errors. Our results suggest complex interplay between issuer and CRA behavior, complicating the evaluation of CRA policy effectiveness.

Stock-market effectiveness in attracting and retaining firms under public ownership depends not only on stand-alone firms’ net listing benefits but also on gains from merging with a public acquirer. Using a novel merger-adjusted listing count, we show that the dramatic (≈50%) post-1996 U.S. listing decline—often attributed to declining listing benefits—is reversed as the “missing” firms de facto continue existing inside their public acquirers. Our merger adjustment also eliminates the U.S. listing gap, pointing instead to a distinct U.S. listing advantage: providing access to a well-functioning market for complex merger transactions.

The market reaction to nonroutine trades by executives and directors is conventionally viewed as increasing in the market’s assessment of insider informativeness about firm value. Using the market reaction as our instrument, we test the proposition that female directors appointed after Norway’s pioneering board gender-balancing quota law exhibit a degree of informativeness similar to that of male directors. Consistent with this proposition, we first show that the average market reaction to female director purchases jumps from a prequota value of zero to a level similar to that of male directors. Second, the market reaction is increasing in the board’s director network connectivity (but not in director busyness). Third, regardless of gender, the positive post-quota market reaction to insider purchases does not translate into holding-period adjusted abnormal performance. Fourth, insider purchase activity by both male and female directors increases significantly during the year following the 2008 financial crisis (when boards were already gender-balanced). This gender-neutral increase in insider purchases caused by the exogenous market-wide stock price drop further suggests that female directors are as informed as their male counterparts about firm value.