While the importance of currency movements to industry competitiveness is theoretically well established, there is little evidence that currency risk impacts US industries. Applying a conditional asset pricing model to 36 US industries, we find that all industries have a significant currency premium that adds about 2.47 percentage points to the cost of equity and accounts for approximately 11.7% of total risk premium in absolute value. Cross-industry variation in the currency premium is explained by foreign income, industry competitiveness, leverage, liquidity, and other industry characteristics, while its time variation is explained by US aggregate foreign trade, monetary policy, growth opportunities, and other macro variables. The results indicate that methodological weakness, not hedging, explains the insignificant industry currency risk premium found in previous work, thus resolving the puzzle that currency risk premium is important at the aggregate stock market level, but not at the industry level.

In contrast to the previously documented cross-border discount, we find that there is positive cross-border effect for US acquirers during late 1990s and early 2000s. This is especially particular the case for those that acquire/merge with targets from segmented financial markets where acquirers experience significantly higher positive abnormal returns than those that acquire targets from integrated financial markets. Furthermore, firms acquiring segmented-market targets are also characterized by significantly higher post-merger operating performance improvement. The results indicate that the observed positive cross-border effect is mainly due to the increase in the number of transactions involving targets from segmented markets, in which the average firm experience significant financial constraints. We contend that value is created by a combination of firms with different financial market integration status, in which funds are provided to high cost firms. The finding that the value creation is even higher within the group of acquirers with a lower cost of capital provides additional support for our conjecture.