Accounting and finance researchers show semi-strong form efficiency or lack thereof by using sequences of prices from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat data for which there is no model for how these prices arise from individual decisions. One needs a setting in which prices (including bids and asks) as well as information about individuals making the choices are both available. To begin to bridge the gap between theory and data, we extend work done by experimental economists on the double auction and model price formation that is or is not semi-strong efficient. Agents in the model uncover prices in a manner consistent with Hayek's notion of price discovery (Hayek 1948).

A common view is that verified earnings reports encourage investment through improved transparency. We lack direct evidence on this foundational proposition because researchers cannot observe counterfactuals in which a manager either (i) must remain silent about performance or (ii) can make any statement about performance they desire, even a bald‐faced lie. We experimentally manipulate whether a manager can provide information to an investor by voluntarily disclosing a verified earnings report, communicating freely via unverifiable cheap talk, or both. Our experiment involves repeated interactions between an uninformed investor with funds that, if invested, generate uncertain gains, and a trustee‐manager who observes and then divides gains after they are realized. We hypothesize and find that (i) the provision of a verified earnings report leads to higher investment compared with a world in which reporting is not possible and (ii) the provision of a verified earnings report leads to more accurate cheap talk communication than when earnings reports are unavailable. Contrary to our prediction, we find that investment when both earnings reports and cheap talk are possible is statistically indistinguishable from investment when only cheap talk communication is available. Further tests reveal that a lack of verified earnings reports leads managers to sustain a partner's investment by providing high returns to the investor while also limiting (but not completely eliminating) deceptive communication and profit‐taking. Our main conclusion is that verified earnings reports promote investment on a stand‐alone basis by improving transparency, but the effect of greater transparency from earnings reports on investment is more nuanced when earnings reports can influence the disclosure of unverifiable information. The main implication of our evidence is that the greater transparency of management behavior with verified earnings reports is not unambiguously positive because making behavior more transparent can lead managers to change their behavior.

This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research.

We explicitly model financial reporting discretion and earnings management in an investment setting where managers have incentives to behave myopically. We show that when managers are sufficiently, but not excessively, myopic, granting them some discretion over the mandatory financial reports can lead to better investment decisions. This finding contrasts with the conventional argument that financial reporting discretion facilitates earnings management and exacerbates managerial myopia, leading to inefficient investments. Costly earnings management, while offering managers some ex post protection against bad luck by decreasing the incidence of low financial reports, reduces the expected net benefit of high financial reports ex ante. Consequently, managers with negative private information find it too costly to mimic those with positive private information, facilitating separation of managers through efficient investment. Thus, curbing managerial myopia by removing or overly restricting earnings management may have the unintended consequence of impairing investment efficiency.

We study the real effects of certification to demonstrate the value of mandatory certification over and above mandatory disclosure in enhancing investment efficiency. In our model, a firm's manager selects a project to maximize the firm's short‐term stock price, which is a function of her certification and disclosure decisions about the outcome of the project. Although the manager might be either forthcoming or strategic with regard to the disclosure of her private information, she can strategically choose whether to incur a cost or not to certify her disclosure, unless mandated. The manager always selects the first‐best project when both certification and disclosure are mandatory. However, when certification is voluntary, project selection is inefficient. In addition, mandating disclosure without mandating certification can lead to lower investment efficiency than mandating neither. In justifying why mandatory certification is beneficial for public firms, our results offer a note of caution regarding the contemplated regulatory moves for increased disclosures by public firms without corresponding certification requirements, for example, the recent SEC proposal requiring extensive climate‐related disclosure.

This paper investigates the effects of a regulatory change in China of the presentation format for research and development (R&D) expense, which mandates public firms to explicitly present R&D expense on their income statements. We predict that this regulation will impact nonstate-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), which care about stock market valuation, more than state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that non-SOEs report significantly higher R&D expense post regulation. Furthermore, the R&D increase strengthens for firms facing higher peer pressure to pursue R&D and high-tech firms and weakens for firms with higher institutional investment. The positive valuation implication of R&D diminishes post regulation, suggesting that investors discount the increase in R&D expense. An additional analysis shows that firms’ innovation efficiency decreases post regulation.

This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants generally enjoy lower interest rate spreads than borrowers with low levels of conservatism and loose performance covenants. Consistent with our signaling theory, in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants are less likely to make abnormal payouts to shareholders. Our empirical results are robust to alternative measures of conservatism and covenant restrictiveness.

This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants generally enjoy lower interest rate spreads than borrowers with low levels of conservatism and loose performance covenants. Consistent with our signaling theory, in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants are less likely to make abnormal payouts to shareholders. Our empirical results are robust to alternative measures of conservatism and covenant restrictiveness.