On July 31, 2001, for the first time in its history, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) began trading three unlisted securities. The DIA, SPY, and QQQ are the most actively traded Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and are listed on the American Stock Exchange. On April 15, 2002 another 27 ETFs followed. These two events provide a unique experiment for studying the impact of a new entrant on market quality. In contrast to recently revived concerns about the adverse impact of market fragmentation, we document that the NYSE entry leads to a dramatic improvement in liquidity that we attribute to the elimination of market-maker rents.

We analyze allocations to institutional and retail investors in 441 initial public offerings (IPOs). In addition to the well-known favorable first-day returns, we show that institutions also obtain more allocations in IPOs with better long-term performance. We find that initial institutional flips help predict future returns, suggesting that at least some institutions retain valuable private information about IPO firms. Collectively, these findings illustrate the importance of aftermarket relations between underwriters and investors and that underwriters have discretionary means to compensate IPO investors beyond first-day returns and price stabilization.