We empirically test implications from location theory using the location of Los Angeles-area gasoline stations in physical space and in the space of product attributes. We consider the effect of demand patterns, entry costs, and several proxies for competition on the tendency for a gasoline station to be physically located more or less closely to its competitors. Using an estimation procedure that controls for spatial autocorrelation and spatial autoregression, and controlling for market characteristics and nonspatial product attributes, we find considerable evidence that firms locate their stations in an attempt to spatially differentiate their product as market competition increases.

The focus of tournament models has been rank‐order compensation schemes whereby participants receive higher payments for higher relative performance, either incrementally or winner‐takes‐all. Our research focuses on a unique tournament that offers rewards for both winning and losing, specifically the National Basketball Association’s regularly scheduled season of games. We examine three NBA seasons to determine whether team performance responded to changes in the underlying tournament incentives provided by the NBA’s introduction and restructuring of the lottery system to determine draft order. Our results yield strong evidence that NBA teams are more likely to lose when incentives to lose are present.