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The Canadian Tax Reform and Its Effect on Stock Prices: A Note
Management succession and financial performance of family controlled firms
This paper examines the immediate and long-term impacts on financial performance of 124 management successions within Canadian family controlled firms. When family successors are appointed, stock prices decline by 3.20% during the 3-day (−1 to +1) event window, whereas there is no significant decrease when either non-family insiders or outsiders are appointed. However, a cross-sectional analysis indicates that the negative stock market reaction to family successors is related to their relatively young age which may reflect a lack of management experience rather than their family connection per se. Investors are uncertain about the “management quality” of family successors who have less established reputations than more seasoned non-family insiders and outsiders. Non-family member appointments tend to follow periods of poor operating performance implying that there might be more scope for improvement when a non-family successor is appointed. Unlike the US sample in McConaughy et al. [McConaughy, D.L., Walker, M.C., Henderson, G.V., Mishra, C.S., 1998. Founding family controlled firms: efficiency and value, Review of Financial Economics 7, 1–19.], which indicates that the median percentage of votes held by controlling families is less than 15%, the Canadian sample indicates a more concentrated ownership with the median percentage of family controlled votes exceeding 51%. Of the firms in our sample, 62% use dual class capitalization to maintain control within the family.
Relative Prices of Dual Class Shares
Empirical studies of dual class shares indicate that superior voting shares (SVS) sell at a premium relative to their counterpart restricted shares (RVS). This paper uses Toronto Stock Exchange data to show that SVS price premium over RVS reflects the expected takeover premium paid to shareholders outside the control block. Thus, marginal shareholders pay a higher SVS price in anticipation of receiving a differential takeover bid as suggested by the extra merger hypothesis. Further analysis indicates that voting power increases the price premium while ownership, size, and the higher trading liquidity of RVS are inversely related to the premium.
Dual class firms: Capitalization, ownership structure and recapitalization back into single class
This paper analyses changes in capitalization and control of dual class firms before and after IPO. The results indicate that the combination of a large controlling shareholder with family interests, rather than concentrated ownership per se, leads to dual class capitalization. During the first 15 years post-IPO, voting leverage continuously increases as the dual class firms issue more restricted than superior voting shares. However, control changes are equally frequent for dual and single class firms suggesting that dual class capitalization is not used to unduly entrench management. We document disputes between restricted and superior voting shareholders to illustrate the potential corporate governance problems which are associated with dual class capitalization. As a result of these disputes, investor interest in dual class equity has decreased and there is a recent trend toward reclassification back into single class equity.
The wealth effects of deregulation of Canadian financial institutions
Comparative study of complete tender offers and partial acquisitions
Capital gains tax and equity values: Empirical test of stock price reaction to the introduction and reduction of capital gains tax exemption
Executive compensation in firms with concentrated control: The impact of dual class structure and family management
We examine how two distinct ownership forms of concentrated control affect executive compensation. We compare executive compensation in dual class firms with that in single class companies with concentrated control. Although both samples of companies have agency problems associated with concentrated control, dual class companies have additional problems associated with controlling shareholders holding smaller equity positions. We show that family members in executive positions in dual class companies are paid significantly more than those of single class companies with concentrated control. The excess is in the form of more incentive compensation (bonuses and stock options). This finding is consistent with optimal contract theory of executive compensation in that the higher compensation is given to prevent dual class executives from taking advantage of their higher voting leverage. Our results are robust to an alternative specification of voting leverage which uses the difference between voting and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders.