Using data collected by the authors on the largest and most durable of worker-owned firms in U.S. manufacturing, this paper is addressed to two questions. First, are the responses of cooperatives to changes in their economic environment different from those of conventional firms? It appears that cooperatives are more inclined to adjust pay than employment. Second, how profitable has membership in the cooperatives been? Using information on share prices, we find membership to have been extremely profitable, and in this sense, the prices of co-ops' shares have been underpriced. The riskiness of cooperative membership is discussed.

Though it is routinely posited that organizations with different property rights will not exhibit the same responses to changes in their economic environment, compelling evidence of such behavior is difficult to find. We collected observations on two types of firms--conventional proprietorships and worker-owned cooperatives--operating in the same industry, in the same location, and at the same period of time. We compare the firms' reactions to changes in their input and output prices and ask whether their reactions are consistent with orthodox models of profit and dividend maximization.

This paper provides evidence that interbank markets are tiered rather than flat, in the sense that most banks do not lend to each other directly but through money center banks acting as intermediaries. We capture the concept of tiering by developing a core-periphery model, and devise a procedure for fitting the model to real-world networks. Using Bundesbank data on bilateral interbank exposures among 2000 banks from 1999 to 2012, we find strong evidence of tiering in the German banking system. This extent of tiering is unlikely to arise in standard random networks. Indeed, we show that bank specialization and balance sheet variables predict how banks position themselves in the interbank market. This link provides a promising avenue for understanding the formation of financial networks.

Though it is routinely posited that organizations with different property rights will not exhibit the same responses to changes in their economic environment, compelling evidence of such behavior is difficult to find. We collected observations on two types of firms--conventional proprietorships and worker-owned cooperatives--operating in the same industry, in the same location, and at the same period of time. We compare the firms' reactions to changes in their input and output prices and ask whether their reactions are consistent with orthodox models of profit and dividend maximization.

Using data collected by the authors on the largest and most durable of worker-owned firms in U.S. manufacturing, this paper is addressed to two questions. First, are the responses of cooperatives to changes in their economic environment different from those of conventional firms? It appears that cooperatives are more inclined to adjust pay than employment. Second, how profitable has membership in the cooperatives been? Using information on share prices, the authors find membership to have been extremely profitable and, in this sense, the prices of co-ops' shares have been underpriced. The riskiness of cooperative memberships is discussed. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.

We examine systemic risk in the interbank market. We first establish that in the German interbank lending market, a few large banks intermediate funding flows between many smaller periphery banks. We then develop a network model in which banks trade off the costs and benefits of link formation. The model is structurally estimated using banks’ preferences as revealed by the observed network structure before the Great Financial Crisis. In out-of-sample tests, model estimates based on pre-crisis data successfully predict changes in the network structure and lending to firms during the Great Financial Crisis. Finally, for each of the intermediaries, we quantify systemic risk and the impact of European Central Bank funding in reducing this risk.

This paper analyzes the individual bidding behavior of German banks in the money market auctions conducted by the ECB from the beginning of 2000:IIIQ to the end of 2001:IQ. Our approach takes a variety of characteristics of the individual banks into account, particularly variables that capture the different use of liquidity and the different attitude towards liquidity risk of the individual banks. It turns out that these characteristics are reflected in banks’ bidding behavior. Thus, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the way liquidity risk is managed in the banking sector.

Empirical research on the effect of bank competition on bank risk has so far produced very inconclusive results. In this paper we revisit this long-standing debate and propose a new empirical approach that is concentrated on the relationship between deposit market competition and bank risk. This approach closely follows the traditional theoretical views of the competition and risk relationship and is focused on testing the classical moral hazard problem of the bank: deposit market competition raises the optimal risk choice of the bank by raising the costs of bank liabilities. Since banks can substitute between retail and wholesale funding, we relate deposit market competition to wholesale market conditions and examine their joint effect on the risk of bank assets. The analysis is based on a unique, comprehensive dataset, which combines retail deposit rate data with data on bank characteristics and data on local deposit market features for a sample of 589 US banks. Our results support the notion of a risk-enhancing effect of deposit market competition.

In this paper, we focus on the interconnectedness of banks and the price they pay for liquidity. We assess how the concentration of credit relationships and the position of a bank in the network topology of the system influence the bank’s ability to meet liquidity demand. We use quarterly data of bilateral interbank credit exposure among all German banks from 2000 to 2008 to measure interbank relationships and network characteristics. We match these data with bids placed by individual banks in the European Central Bank’s (ECB) weekly repo auctions. The bids measure each bank’s willingness to pay for liquidity, since they had variable rate tenders with a “pay-your-bid” price. Controlling for bank characteristics and the daily fulfillment of reserve requirements, we find that banks with a more diversified borrowing structure in the interbank market bid significantly less aggressively and pay a lower price for liquidity in the ECB’s main refinancing operations. These findings suggest that incentives to diversify banks’ liquidity risk dominate the benefits of private information. When the network position of the bank is taken into account, we find that central lenders in the money market bid more aggressively in auctions.