This paper examines the monitoring effect of disclosure frequency from a shareholder perspective. For our analyses, we use a setting in the European Union in which reporting frequency requirements differed across and within countries before being harmonized by a directive requiring the implementation of quarterly disclosure. We investigate how both cross‐sectional differences in reporting frequency and their harmonization affect shareholders' ability to monitor managers. To gauge monitoring effects, we use shareholders' valuation of cash assets. We find that semi‐annual reporters exhibit lower cash valuation than quarterly reporters. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we show that these differences recede after semi‐annual reporters implement a higher reporting frequency. Our results are consistent with the notion that more frequent disclosure reduces expected agency costs by providing shareholders with the opportunity for timelier monitoring to constrain managers from expropriating corporate resources. In additional analyses, we find that this monitoring effect is robust to using alternative measures of the change in cash and agency costs as well as alternative benchmark groups. Further, we find stronger effects when corporate governance or earnings quality is low.

This study investigates who makes partner in Big 4 audit firms. Building on prior qualitative research, we conduct the first large scale study using archival data to examine the incremental importance of different individual auditor characteristics for making partner. For our analyses, we collect information on German auditors from a business-oriented social network site. We conduct a longitudinal analysis for a cohort of Big 4 senior managers and directors to identify determinants of making partner. We find that economic capital, social capital, and institutionalized cultural capital matter for making partner. Further, we find that female and foreign auditors are less likely to become partner than their counterparts. In addition, we perform a cross-sectional analysis using a larger sample of auditors to identify the distinct characteristics of Big 4 partners compared to Big 4 senior managers, Big 4 directors, and non-Big 4 partners, and find results consistent with the longitudinal analysis.

This study investigates the determinants and consequences of forming dyads at the top level of audit teams, i.e., dyads between concurring and lead auditor. We apply the sociological theory of homophily, i.e., the implicit preference for similar others, to hierarchically structured auditor dyads. Our regression analyses reveal that sharing the same gender and the same ethnicity, measured by dialect, increases the likelihood of dyad formation beyond what one would expect based on the characteristics of the pool of available auditors. Further, we observe that forming auditor dyads sharing the same age is avoided, suggesting that the need to establish a legitimate hierarchical relationship through social differentiation represents a boundary condition for homophily. Testing for the consequences of auditor dyad formation using an instrumental variable approach, we find that auditor dyads sharing the same dialect provide lower audit quality. We conclude that homophily matters in auditor dyad formation with potentially adverse consequences for audit quality.

We examine the impact of a disclosure mandate for greenhouse gas emissions on firms’ subsequent emission levels and financial operating performance. For UK-incorporated listed firms a carbon disclosure mandate was adopted in 2013. Our difference-in-differences design shows that firms affected by the mandate reduced their emissions by about 8% relative to a control group of European firms. At the same time, our tests indicate that the treated firms experienced no significant changes in their gross margins. Taken together, our findings indicate that the reporting mandate had a real effect on the variable to be disclosed without adversely affecting the financial operating performance of the treated firms.