We examine the impact of institutional ownership on financial reporting discretion, focusing on whether the impact varies with institutions' cost of acquiring monitoring information. Using geographic distance between the firm and the institutional investor as a proxy for the cost of acquiring monitoring information, we find that corporate managers are less likely to use financial reporting discretion in the presence of local monitoring institutions than distant monitoring institutions. We also find that the impact of monitoring institutions on financial reporting discretion varies with the costs and benefits of financial reporting discretion.

ABSTRACT: We examine whether the two distinct post-earnings-announcement drifts associated with seasonal random-walk-based and analyst-based earnings surprises are attributable to the trading activities of distinct sets of investors. We predict and find that small (large) traders continue to trade in the direction of seasonal random-walk-based (analyst-based) earnings surprises after earnings announcements. We also find that when small (large) traders react more thoroughly to seasonal random-walk- (analyst-) based earnings surprises at the earnings announcements, the respective drift attenuates. Further evidence suggests that delayed small trades associated with random-walk-based surprises are consistent with small traders’ failure to understand time-series properties of earnings, whereas delayed large trades associated with analyst-based surprises are more consistent with a longer price discovery process. We also find that the analyst-based drift has declined in recent years.