Abstract This paper examines CEO pay at nonprofits. Using compensation data for 14,111 nonprofits, we find that CEO pay dropped by 2% after legislation in New York reduced CEOs’ ability to influence their own pay. Despite lower pay, CEOs exerted more effort, and nonprofit performance improved. The effects were stronger at commercial nonprofits than at charities and for male CEOs than female CEOs. These findings are consistent with a model where some nonprofit CEOs derive meaning from their work and compensation can be rigged. Overall, our results suggest that regulation that targets the pay-setting process can improve organizational outcomes at nonprofits.

Abstract We study the effects of state-level Paid Family Leave (PFL) laws on US firms across a broad panel of private and public companies. Following PFL adoption, female employee turnover declines, labor productivity increases, and treated firms experience significant improvements in operating performance. These effects are stronger in regions with a larger supply of childbearing-age female labor, among R&D-intensive firms and firms with high intangible capital, consistent with a mechanism in which PFL reduces job separation expectations and encourages investment in firm-specific human capital. Our findings suggest that PFL can generate tangible firm-level benefits by enhancing workforce stability and productivity.