Analysts follow disproportionally firms whose fundamentals correlate more with those of their industry peers. This coverage pattern supports models of profit-maximizing information intermediaries producing preferentially information valuable in pricing more stocks. We designate highly followed firms whose fundamentals best predict those of peer firms as bellwether firms. When analysts revise a bellwether firm's earning forecast, it changes the prices of other firms significantly; however, revisions for firms that are less intensely followed do not change the prices of heavily followed firms. Unidirectional information spillovers explain how the more accurately priced stocks might exhibit more comovement.

Extant literature suggests that bank monitoring improves corporate governance. This paper demonstrates that inefficiency in banking can also significantly reduce the equity capital markets' disciplinary power. Specifically, we show that in an environment in which the banking system is dominated by inefficient state-owned banks, controlling shareholders' tunneling activity is positively associated with firms' bank loan access. This relation is particularly strong in firms with high borrowing capacity, as measured by tangibility, and in regions where the banking industry is severely inefficient. As firms with high tunneling can continue to receive new loans with interest cost compatible to others, equity capital market disciplinary forces do not apply to them. Indeed, we further show that through tunneling, bank financing is negatively associated with future firm performance. These results suggest that, for an economy to develop mature capital markets, it is imperative to improve banking efficiency because its inefficiency dilutes the monitoring role of the market.

China’s monetary stimulation after the global financial crisis rapidly boosted its GDP. We argue that its efficacy derives from state control over its banking and corporate sectors. Beijing ordered state-owned banks to lend and they lent. Beijing ordered centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest and they invested. Our data show much of this investment was highly leveraged purchases of real estate and land prices rises occurred where these SOEs were active buyers. This episode mimics the credit channel for monetary policy, but actually entails internal transfers between arms of the government pressuring on real estate prices upwards.

This paper examines how bank regulation and supervision measures affect the synchronicity of bank stock returns, a measure that is negatively related to variations in bank-specific fundamentals and stock price informativeness. Using data from World Bank surveys in 35 countries, we find that bank stock returns are less synchronous in countries with more stringent capital regulations, more supervision that emphasizes private monitoring, and less government bank ownership. On the other hand, direct government control of bank activities, as well as direct government monitoring and disciplining, do not reduce stock return synchronicity.

Analysts follow disproportionally firms whose fundamentals correlate more with those of their industry peers. This coverage pattern supports models of profit-maximizing information intermediaries producing preferentially information valuable in pricing more stocks. We designate highly followed firms whose fundamentals best predict those of peer firms as bellwether firms. When analysts revise a bellwether firm's earning forecast, it changes the prices of other firms significantly; however, revisions for firms that are less intensely followed do not change the prices of heavily followed firms. Unidirectional information spillovers explain how the more accurately priced stocks might exhibit more comovement.