Journal Article Time-Varying Expected Small Firm Returns and Closed-End Fund Discounts Get access Bhaskaran Swaminathan Bhaskaran Swaminathan Cornell University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 9, Issue 3, July 1996, Pages 845–887, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/9.3.845 Published: 03 June 2015

[This article describes the relation between closed-end fund discounts and time-varying expected excess returns on small firms. The results indicate that closed-end fund discounts forecast future excess returns on small firms. The information in discounts is independent of that in other commonly used forecasting variables such as the dividend yield on the market, the default spread, and the term spread. Furthermore, the closed-end fund discount forecasts only the small firm factor return and is the only variable that forecasts the small firm factor return. Additional tests indicate that the information in discounts is related to expectations of future earnings growth and expectations of future inflation. These results provide significant support for a rational explanation of the time-series relationship between discounts and expected returns on small firms.]

While IPOs have been underpriced by more than 10% during the past two decades, we find that in a sample of more than 2,000 IPOs from 1980 to 1997, the median IPO was significantly overvalued at the offer price relative to valuations based on industry peer price multiples. This overvaluation ranges from 14% to 50% depending on the peer matching criteria. Cross-sectional regressions show that "overvalued" IPOs provide high first-day returns, but low long-run risk-adjusted returns. These overvalued IPOs have lower profitability, higher accruals, and higher analyst growth forecasts than "undervalued" IPOs. Ex post, the projected high growth of overvalued IPOs fails to materialize, while their profitability declines from pre-IPO levels. These results suggest IPO investors are deceived by optimistic growth forecasts and pay insufficient attention to profitability in valuing IPOs.

This paper examines the interaction between momentum in the returns of equities and corporate bonds. We find that investment grade corporate bonds do not exhibit momentum at the three- to 12-month horizons. Instead, the evidence suggests that they exhibit reversals. However, significant evidence exists of a momentum spillover from equities to investment grade corporate bonds of the same firm. Firms earning high (low) equity returns over the previous year earn high (low) bond returns the following year. The spillover results are stronger among firms with lower-grade debt and higher equity trading volume, seem robust to various risk and liquidity controls, and hold even after controlling for past earnings surprises. In examining the source of the spillover, we find that the bond ratings of firms with positive (negative) equity momentum continue to improve (deteriorate) in the future, suggesting underreaction to the information in past equity prices about changing default risk is a likely source of the spillover effect. Overall, our results suggest that both equity and debt underreact to firm fundamentals, but past equity returns is a better proxy of firm fundamentals than past bond returns.

This paper finds that default betas are significantly related to the cross-section of average bond returns even after controlling for characteristics such as duration, ratings, and yield-to-maturity. Among characteristics, only yield-to-maturity is significantly related to average bond returns after controlling for default and term betas. The default and term factors are able to price the returns of beta-sorted portfolios better than they do the returns of yield-sorted portfolios. The magnitude of the ex ante Sharpe ratio generated by yield-sorted portfolios suggests non-risk-based explanations. Overall, given the elusive nature of systematic risk in empirical asset pricing, the central finding of our paper is that systematic risk matters for corporate bonds.

[In this article we are concerned with the effect of the number of investment analysts following a firm on the speed of adjustment of the firm's stock price to new information that has common effects across firms. It is found that returns on portfolios of firms that are followed by many analysts tend to lead those of firms that are followed by fewer analysts, even when the firms are of approximately the same size. Many analyst firms also tend to respond more rapidly to market returns than do few analyst firms, adjusting for firm size. This relation, however, is nonlinear, and the marginal effect of the number of analysts on the speed of price adjustment increases with the number of analysts.]

While IPOs have been underpriced by more than 10% during the past two decades, we find that in a sample of more than 2, 000 IPOs from 1980 to 1997, the median IPO was significantly overvalued at the offer price relative to valuations based on industry peer price multiples. This overvaluation ranges from 14% to 50% depending on the peer matching criteria. Cross-sectional regressions show that "overvalued" IPOs provide high first-day returns, but low long-run risk-adjusted returns. These overvalued IPOs have lower profitability, higher accruals, and higher analyst growth forecasts than "undervalued" IPOs. Ex post, the projected high growth of overvalued IPOs fails to materialize, while their profitability declines from pre-IPO levels. These results suggest IPO investors are deceived by optimistic growth forecasts and pay insufficient attention to profitability in valuing IPOs.

This paper finds that trading volume is a significant determinant of the lead‐lag patterns observed in stock returns. Daily and weekly returns on high volume portfolios lead returns on low volume portfolios, controlling for firm size. Nonsynchronous trading or low volume portfolio autocorrelations cannot explain these findings. These patterns arise because returns on low volume portfolios respond more slowly to information in market returns. The speed of adjustment of individual stocks confirms these findings. Overall, the results indicate that differential speed of adjustment to information is a significant source of the cross‐autocorrelation patterns in short‐horizon stock returns.

We model the time‐series relation between price and intrinsic value as a cointegrated system, so that price and value are long‐term convergent. In this framework, we compare the performance of alternative estimates of intrinsic value for the Dow 30 stocks. During 1963–1996, traditional market multiples (e.g., B/P, E/P, and D/P ratios) have little predictive power. However, a V/P ratio, where V is based on a residual income valuation model, has statistically reliable predictive power. Further analysis shows time‐varying interest rates and analyst forecasts are important to the success of V. Alternative forecast horizons and risk premia are less important.