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Open-End Organizational Structures and Limits to Arbitrage

Review of Financial Studies 2018 31(2), 773-810
We provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with high share restrictions having a lower degree of open-endedness also trade against longterm mispricing to a larger extent than do other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage.

Publicizing Arbitrage

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2021 56(3), 789-820 open access
How does greater public disclosure of arbitrage activity and informed trading affect price efficiency? To answer this, we exploit rule amendments in U.S. securities markets, which impose a higher frequency of public disclosure of short positions. Higher public disclosure can hurt the production of information and deteriorate efficiency, or it can be beneficial by mitigating the limits to arbitrage and diffusing arbitrageurs’ information faster. With more frequent disclosure, information encapsulated within short interest is incorporated into prices faster, improving price efficiency. We find important reductions in short sellers’ horizon risk and increases in short sales with the rule amendments.

Margin Trading and Comovement During Crises

Review of Finance 2020 24(4), 813-846
We exploit threshold rules governing margin trading eligibility in India to identify a causal link between margin trading and increased comovement during crises. Margin trading explains more than one-quarter of the increase return comovement that we observe during crises. To understand the mechanisms driving this result, we evaluate the relative importance of stock connections through common brokers (who provide margin financing) versus common margin traders. We find that common brokers are most important. Margin-eligible stocks that are more connected through common brokers experience larger crisis-period increases in pairwise return comovement, especially when those brokers’ clients have experienced recent portfolio losses, when their clients have outstanding margin loans in more volatile stocks, and when the brokers are large. These findings are consistent with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), in which initial shocks propagate due to the tightening of margin constraints imposed by financial intermediaries.

Trader Leverage and Liquidity

Journal of Finance 2017 72(4), 1567-1610 open access
Does trader leverage drive equity market liquidity? We use the unique features of the margin trading system in India to identify a causal relationship between traders’ ability to borrow and a stock's market liquidity. To quantify the impact of trader leverage, we employ a regression discontinuity design that exploits threshold rules that determine a stock's margin trading eligibility. We find that liquidity is higher when stocks become eligible for margin trading and that this liquidity enhancement is driven by margin traders’ contrarian strategies. Consistent with downward liquidity spirals due to deleveraging, we also find that this effect reverses during crises.

Open-End Organizational Structures and Limits to Arbitrage

Review of Financial Studies 2018 31(2), 773-810
We provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with highshare restrictions having a lower degree of open-endedness also trade against long-term mispricing to a larger extentthan do other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage. Received November 4, 2015; editorial decision March 10, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

ES Risks and Shareholder Voice

Review of Financial Studies 2023 36(12), 4824-4863 open access
We examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face. Higher support in failed ES proposals predicts subsequent ES incidents and the effects of these incidents on shareholder value. Examining the detailed records of fund votes, we find that agency frictions between a group of shareholders contribute to proposal failure.

Swing Pricing and Fragility in Open-End Mutual Funds

Review of Financial Studies 2021 35(1), 1-50 open access
How can fragility be averted in open-end mutual funds? In recent years, markets have observed an innovation that changed the way open-end funds are priced. Alternative pricing rules (known as swing pricing) adjust funds’ net asset values to pass on funds’ trading costs to transacting shareholders. Using unique data on investor-level transactions in U.K. corporate bond funds, we show that swing pricing eliminates the first-mover advantage arising from the traditional pricing rule and significantly reduces outflows during market stress. Swing pricing also reduces concavity in the flow-performance relationship and dilution in fund performance.

Learning about Mutual Fund Managers

Journal of Finance 2016 71(6), 2809-2860
We study capital allocations to managers with two mutual funds, and show that investors learn about managers from their performance records. Flows into a fund are predicted by the manager's performance in his other fund, especially when he outperforms and when signals from the other fund are more useful. In equilibrium, capital should be allocated such that there is no cross‐fund predictability. However, we find positive predictability, particularly among underperforming funds. Our results are consistent with incomplete learning: while investors move capital in the right direction, they do not withdraw enough capital when the manager underperforms in his other fund.