Previous studies show that economic policy uncertainty has been rising steadily since the 1960s (Baker et al. 2014), and that this secular increase has led to harmful economic outcomes such as reduced investment rates (Gulen and Ion 2016). Other studies find that politically connected directors play a unique role in corporate decision making and firm valuation (Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2009). We combine these two lines of research to examine the ability of politically experienced directors (PEDs) to mitigate the harmful investment effects of policy uncertainty. Our results show that the presence of at least one PED on a company board reduces the sensitivity of investment decisions to policy uncertainty by 49% relative to firms without PEDs. These results are stronger when the PED serves on a presidential (as opposed to legislative) committee, and among firms most vulnerable to investment irreversibility. We explore omitted variables bias and instrumental variable estimation in robustness testing to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Overall, our findings align with the theoretical framework of Pastor and Veronesi (2013) and real options theory, and confirm that PEDs can significantly reduce the harmful effects of policy uncertainty.

Theory provides several channels linking the corporate life cycle and lending risks. Using a sample of 20,307 firm-loan observations spanning 5,076 publicly traded U.S. firms, we find an economically significant relationship between firm life cycle stage and lending spreads. Based on the Owen and Yawson (2010) life cycle stage classification, young firms are expected to pay at least 15 bps more than mature firms, whereas mature firms pay at least 11 bps more than old firms. According to the Dickinson (2011) cash flow classification, firms in the introduction and decline phases pay lending spreads that are 6 and 12 percent greater than firms in the mature phase. We explore omitted variables bias and instrumental variable estimation in robustness testing to alleviate endogeneity concerns. A mechanism analysis shows that credit risk, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk follow the corporate life pattern in accordance with loan spreads, suggesting that banks charge a premium to compensate for risk. Our results support the theoretical prediction that structural changes occur as firms evolve across the corporate life cycle.