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Crowdsourcing and Optimal Market Design

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2025
Mechanisms used to derive optimal allocations are typically designed assuming agents fully know their own preferences. It is often impossible to duplicate optimal allocations when agents imperfectly observe object characteristics. I present a crowdsourcing mechanism to approximate optimal allocations under imperfect observations. To ensure truthtelling, agents are punished when their reports differ from the “wisdom of the crowd.” Under mild conditions, this crowdsourcing-with-punishment mechanism replicates the full-information optimal allocation with probability exponentially converging to one in the market size, with small waste. No alternative mechanism meaningfully does better. The proposed mechanism can be applied in many settings, including matching markets.

Persuaded Search

Journal of Political Economy 2025 133(10), 3167-3207
We consider sequential search by an agent who cannot observe the quality of goods but can acquire information from a profit-maximizing principal with limited commitment power. The principal can charge higher prices for more informative signals, but high future prices discourage continued search, thereby reducing the principal?s profits. A unique stationary equilibrium outcome exists: the principal (i) sells the agent only partial information, (ii) induces the socially efficient stopping rule, and (iii) extracts the full surplus. However, introducing an additional, free source of information can lead to inefficiency in equilibrium.