This paper examines whether dividend policy is associated with earnings management and whether the relationship varies across countries with wide-ranging degrees of institutional strength and transparency. Based on a sample of 23,429 corporations from 29 countries, we show that dividend payers manage earnings less than dividend non-payers, and that this evidence is stronger in countries with weak investor protection and high opacity. Further, we find that dividend payers manage earnings less when they issue equity following dividend payments, and that this result is more pronounced in countries with weak institutions and low transparency. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms may employ dividend policies associated with less earnings manipulation to mitigate agency concerns and to establish credible reputation, thereby facilitating access to external funds.

We examine the governance transfer effect of corporate blockholders in a sample of 892 block acquisitions across 42 countries from 1990 to 2008. Using earnings management as a proxy for corporate governance outcome, we find that target firms' earnings management is aligned with that of block acquirers after acquisitions, implying that blockholders transfer their own governance quality to investee firms. We further identify three economic mechanisms that underlie the governance transfer effect, namely, monitoring effectiveness, monitoring cost, and monitoring environment. Our findings provide new insights into the governance role of blockholders.

We examine the effect of foreign institutional investors on firm innovation. Using firm-level data across 26 non-U.S. economies between 2000 and 2010, we show that foreign institutional ownership has a positive, causal effect on firm innovation. We further explore three possible underlying mechanisms through which foreign institutions affect firm innovation: Foreign institutions act as active monitors, provide insurance for firm managers against innovation failures, and promote knowledge spillovers from high-innovation economies. Our article sheds new light on the real effects of foreign institutions on firm innovation.

Motivated by ongoing debates on investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) and its documented decline and disappearance in the U.S., we investigate the determinants of ICFS. Using firm-level data across 41 countries for the 1993–2013 period, we document an important role of asset tangibility in explaining the patterns in ICFS. Asset tangibility affects ICFS through two channels: investment intensity and cash flow persistence. As the share of tangible capital, investment and cash flow persistence has fallen in developed economies, ICFS has declined. In contrast, as developing economies operate with more tangible capital, have higher investment rates and more persistent cash flows, their ICFS is more stable. The results support our explanation of ICFS as a reflection of capital (investment) intensity and income predictability, rather than a measure of financial constraints.