The effect of diversification on firm performance has been debated. We reexamine the effect using a sample of 44,248 observations of non-financial US firms for the 1997–2009 period employing the quantile regression approach. Our empirical results show that the effect of diversification on firm performance is not homogeneous across various quantile levels: the diversification discount (premium) shows up in firms with high (low) RoE quantiles. Further, we find that diversification affects firm risk as well. Therefore, we consider a risk-adjusted performance measure and find that both diversification discount and premium disappear, which is consistent with the risk-return trade-off principle.

This paper investigates the relationship between sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment and the return-to-risk performance of target firms. Specifically, we find that target firm raw returns decline following SWF investment. Though risk also declines following SWF investment, we find that SWF investment is associated with a reduction in the compensation of risk over the 5years following acquisition. Firm volatility decomposition suggests that idiosyncratic risk is what mainly drives these impacts toward decline. Employing a multinomial logit framework wherein combinations of target returns and risk movements are categorized, we see that, in cases of foreign investment, SWFs’ target firm performance most closely resembles that of other government-owned firms. The observed results are inconsistent with predictions of higher volatility and improved returns due to monitoring firm activities from the institutional investor literature. This suggests that SWFs may not provide some of the benefits that are offered by other institutional investors.

We examine the role of bilateral political relations in sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment decisions. Our empirical results suggest that political relations play a role in SWF decision making. Contrary to predictions based on the FDI and political relations literature, we find that relative to nations in which they do not invest, SWFs prefer to invest in nations with which they have weaker political relations. Using a two-stage Cragg model, we find that political relations are an important factor in where SWFs invest but matter less in determining how much to invest. Inconsistent with the FDI and political relations literature, these results suggest that SWFs behave differently than rational investors who maximize return while minimizing risk. Consistent with the trade and political relations literature, we find that SWF investment has a positive (negative) impact for relatively closed (open) countries. Our results suggest that SWFs use—at least partially—non-financial motives in investment decisions.