I examine whether book-tax differences (BTDs) are mispriced. I predict that BTD mispricing is the operating cash flows-to-price (CFO/P) anomaly in disguise. Using both time-series asset pricing tests and cross-sectional returns tests, I provide consistent evidence that returns to trading on BTDs are explained by CFO/P. Rather than being an independent anomaly, the findings indicate that any evidence of BTD mispricing is subsumed by the broader CFO/P anomaly. These findings stand in contrast to many studies that infer BTDs possess unique information for future earnings reflected in stock prices with a delay.

Using the IPO setting, we test whether firms signal the quality of their investments in innovation activities by claiming R&D tax credits. We find the presence and amount of the R&D credit are each associated with lower information asymmetry and with higher investor demand at IPO. Conservatively, we estimate that sample firms realize additional IPO proceeds of 32–45 percent of their creditable R&D expenditures, indicating economically significant non-tax benefits associated with the R&D credit. We verify the R&D credit signal by showing its positive association with firms’ future patenting activity, patent citations, and post-IPO stock returns. Results from these tests are concentrated among firms limited in their ability to obtain tax benefits from R&D credits, consistent with the R&D credit providing nontax benefits as a signal of innovation investment quality.

Corporate tax avoidance is a recurring focus of policy‐makers, the media, activist groups, and researchers. This focus often centers on multinational enterprises' (MNEs) use of tax havens, with a wide body of research utilizing MNEs' tax haven use as evidence of corporate tax avoidance activities. However, the common assumption that MNEs operate in tax havens only for tax avoidance purposes overlooks the role tax havens play as homes for captive insurance entities, which allow firms to secure “self” insurance coverage but do not provide obvious differential federal tax benefits. When we remove the effect of captives on tax haven–based measures, we observe a roughly threefold increase in the magnitude of tax savings specifically associated with haven noncaptive activity. We document that nonfinancial firms' use of captive insurance occurs in approximately 11% of firm‐years and spans nearly all Fama–French 49 industries. We construct a haven captive use determinants model, with strong discriminatory power and compelling out‐of‐sample corroboration tests, that future research can employ to account for firms' use of haven captives. Our findings underscore the importance of separating captive and noncaptive‐related haven activities.

Social hierarchy theory predicts that the power and status of an organizational function have a first-order effect on the function's ability to influence outcomes. We find that the rank of the title of the top tax executive is positively associated with tax planning after controlling for treatment effects. Our inferences remain when (1) using changes in the size of the c-suite as a shock to the relative power and status of the tax function, and (2) examining promotions and demotions in title rank. Point estimates suggest that tax function power and status are up to 2.6 times as important as tax planning resources, up to 4.0 times as important as tax function-specific expertise, and, more often than not, more important than manager fixed effects. Overall, results suggest that the power and status of the tax function is often what matters most in determining tax outcomes.

Using the shadow insurance setting, we study the interplay between tax and nontax incentives in income shifting. Shadow insurance involves intercompany transactions designed to help firms meet regulatory capital requirements. However, prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), foreign-owned life insurance firms could save taxes by using shadow insurance to shift U.S. profits to tax havens. Consistent with expectations, we find that while nontax incentives appear to be the dominant factor behind firms' use of shadow insurance, tax considerations also played a role for certain firms. We also find that shadow insurance is associated with lower liquid asset holdings and increased credit risk. Overall, our results suggest that taxes were an important incentive for foreign-owned life insurance firms to use shadow insurance pre-TCJA. Moreover, in this setting, nontax considerations appeared to have motivated U.S.-owned firms' use of tax havens.