ABSTRACT We examine the use of intuition versus analytical thinking in auditor risk assessment using a task that requires auditors to assess a group of impairment indicators. We expect that auditor intuition, rooted in the subconscious, more likely reacts to impairment indicator risk than does auditor analytical thinking. Results from two different experiments support this expectation for less‐experienced audit seniors. These seniors are more likely to assess step‐zero impairment indicators as signaling potential impairment when prompted to think intuitively versus analytically . In contrast, a third experiment finds that experienced seniors are more likely to assess step‐zero impairment indicators as signaling potential impairment when prompted to think analytically versus intuitively . This is consistent with the more experienced but still non‐expert seniors possessing developed analytical thinking, but struggling to effectively use their intuition. Our results inform theory by suggesting under what conditions auditor intuition and analytical thinking produce differential risk sensitivity. Furthermore, our results inform practice, given regulators' stated focus on auditor skepticism and impairment assessments.

Recent reviews of the academic literature indicate that little is known regarding how users evaluate the materiality levels auditors use or respond to quantitative materiality disclosure. Regulators around the world have taken different stances on whether materiality should, or should not, be disclosed in the auditor’s report. In response to the dearth of research on these policy decisions, we examine the effect of audit materiality disclosures, or lack thereof, on professional investors’ decision making across different investment contexts (debt vs. equity, public vs. private). Our study is designed to test global audit public policy and as such our hypotheses are motivated by assertions made by regulators, auditing standards, and audit theory. Among a sample of 246 professional investors in our main experiment and 91 professional investors in two supplemental experiments, we find no consistent evidence that investors incorporate materiality disclosures into their investment decisions. Most importantly, we find evidence that investors’ understanding of materiality is not in line with regulator assertions. For example, investors fail to make consistent connections between the amount of disclosed audit materiality and the level of auditor effort. Our results hold across debt and equity investment settings for both public and private companies. In sum, our findings suggest that disclosures of audit materiality are not well understood by professional investors and are not viewed as decision relevant. This research informs practitioners, regulators, and academics regarding the effect of materiality disclosure on investor decision making as well as stakeholders’ views and expectations of overall materiality.