de Groot, Richter, and Throckmorton, 2018 argue that the model in Basu and Bundick, 2017 can match the empirical evidence only because the model assumes an asymptote in the economy's response to an uncertainty shock. In this Reply, we provide new results showing that our model's ability to match the data does not rely either on assuming preferences that imply an asymptote nor on a particular value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We demonstrate that shifting to preferences that are not vulnerable to the Comment's critique does not change our previous conclusions about the propagation of uncertainty shocks to macroeconomic outcomes.

This paper examines the role of uncertainty shocks in a one-sector, representative-agent dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model. When prices are exible, uncertainty shocks are not capable of producing business-cycle comovements among key macro variables. With countercyclical markups through sticky prices, however, uncertainty shocks can generate uctuations that are consistent with business cycles. Monetary policy usually plays a key role in osetting the negative impact of uncertainty shocks. If the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound, then monetary policy can no longer perform its usual stabilizing function and higher uncertainty has even more negative eects on the economy. Calibrating the size of uncertainty shocks using uctuations in the VIX, we nd that increased uncertainty about the future may indeed have played a signicant role in worsening the Great Recession, which is consistent with statements by policymakers, economists, and the nancial press.

In a macroeconomic model with drifting long-run inflation expectations, the anchoring of inflation expectations manifests in two testable predictions. First, expectations about inflation far in the future should no longer respond to news about current inflation. Second, better anchored inflation expectations weaken the relationship between unemployment and inflation, flattening the reduced-form Phillips curve. We evaluate both predictions and find that the Federal Reserve’s communication of a numerical inflation objective, first through its Summary of Economic Projections and later through the announcement of a 2% target in 2012, better anchored inflation expectations. Moreover, inflation expectations in the United States have remained anchored amid the volatility of the COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast, similar analysis reveals no evidence of anchoring in Japan despite the adoption of a numerical inflation target.

We examine the macroeconomic effects of forward guidance shocks at the zero lower bound. Empirically, we identify forward guidance shocks using unexpected changes in futures contracts around monetary policy announcements. We then embed these policy shocks in a vector autoregression to trace out their macroeconomic implications. Forward guidance shocks that lower expected future policy rates lead to moderate increases in economic activity and inflation. After examining forward guidance shocks in the data, we show that a standard model of nominal price rigidity can reproduce our empirical findings. To estimate our theoretical model, we generate a model-implied futures curve that closely links our model with the data. Our results suggest no disconnect between the empirical effects of forward guidance shocks around policy announcements and the predictions from a standard theoretical model.