[Investor sophistication has lagged behind the growing complexity of retail financial markets. To explore this, we develop a dynamic model to study the interaction between obfuscation and investor sophistication in mutual fund markets. Taking into account different learning mechanisms within the investor population, we characterize the optimal timing of obfuscation for financial institutions who offer retail products. We show that educational initiatives that are directed to facilitate learning by investors may induce providers to increase wasteful obfuscation, further disorienting investors and decreasing overall welfare. Obfuscation decreases with competition among firms, since the information rents from obfuscation dissipate as each institution attracts a smaller market share.]

We model a retail financial institution that outsources its advice services to an intermediary, making the two parties jointly responsible for consumers' experience with the products. In this context, courts that enforce state-contingent legal rules are necessary in order to avoid market breakdowns. To maximize social welfare, the government implements a system of penalties that depends on product characteristics and on the firm's relative ability to control quality. This legal system emphasizes reliable advice over transaction pace. Furthermore, the implicit team structure of the firm and its intermediary prevents self-regulation from achieving the same social efficiency.

We analyze how the work ethic of managers impacts a firm's employment contracts, riskiness, growth potential, and organizational structure. Flat contracts are optimal for diligent managers because they reduce risk‐sharing costs, but they attract egoistic agents who shirk and unskilled agents who add no value. Stable, bureaucratic firms with low growth potential are more likely to gain value from managerial diligence. Firms that hire from a virtuous pool of agents are more conservative in their investments and have a horizontal corporate structure. Our theory also yields several testable implications that distinguish it from standard agency models.

There is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that the law of one price is violated in retail financial markets: there is significant price dispersion even when products are homogeneous. Also, despite the large number of firms in the market, prices remain above marginal cost and may even rise as more firms enter. In a non-cooperative oligopoly pricing model, I show that these anomalies arise when firms add complexity to their price structures. Complexity increases the market power of the firms because it prevents some consumers from becoming knowledgeable about prices in the market. In the model, as competition increases, firms tend to add more complexity to their prices as a best response, rather than make their disclosures more transparent. Because this may substantially decrease consumer surplus in these markets, such practices have important welfare implications.

[We develop a theoretical model to analyze the effects of libertarian paternalism on information production and financial decision making. Individuals in our model appreciate the information content of the recommendations made by a social planner. This affects their incentive to gather information, and in turn the speed at which information spreads across market participants, via social learning or formal advice channels. We characterize situations in which libertarian paternalism improves welfare and contrast them with scenarios in which this policy is suboptimal because of its negative impact on the production and propagation of information.]

The increasing dependence of individuals on debt financing raises several welfare considerations that we analyze in this paper. We develop a dynamic, competitive model of relationship banking to determine how regulation influences borrowing and lending behavior, and analyze how it affects welfare in the market. We characterize the lending regimes that arise based on public policy, and evaluate the optimal choice by the government to induce particular lending practices to arise. Finally, we consider the effect that a credit reporting agency has on the market. In the paper, we highlight the new empirical implications that the model generates.

Is there a trade-off between the short-run and long-run real effects of monetary policy “leaning against the wind”? We provide novel evidence on this question from the United States in 1920–1921. Our identification strategy exploits county-level variation in access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window, and hand-collected data on banking and agriculture in Illinois. In the short term, tightened conditions at the discount window decreased bank lending and lowered crop prices and farm revenues. In the long term, however, they lowered debt-to-output levels and led to greater farmland utilization, suggesting an avoidance of debt overhang problems.

How do differences of opinion affect asset prices? Do investors earn a risk premium when disagreement arises in the market? Despite their fundamental importance, these questions are among the most controversial issues in finance. In this paper, we use a novel data set that allows us to directly measure the level of disagreement among Wall Street mortgage dealers about prepayment speeds. We examine how disagreement evolves over time and study its effects on expected returns, return volatility, and trading volume in the mortgage-backed security market. We find that increased disagreement is associated with higher expected returns, higher return volatility, and larger trading volume. These results imply that there is a positive risk premium for disagreement in asset prices. We also show that volatility in and of itself does not lead to higher trading volume. Instead, only when disagreement arises in the market is higher uncertainty associated with more trading. Finally, we are able to distinguish empirically between two competing hypotheses regarding how information in markets gets incorporated into asset prices. We find that sophisticated investors appear to update their beliefs through a rational expectations mechanism when disagreement arises.

We study a firm’s investment in organization capital by analyzing a dynamic model of language development and intrafirm communication. We show that firms with richer internal language (i.e., more organization capital) have lower employee turnover, and higher diversity in skill and wages among incumbents who are promoted from within the firm. Our results also suggest that firms in rapidly changing industries are less likely to invest in organization capital, and are more likely to have high managerial turnover. Finally, our model shows that employment protection regulations lead to more investment in organization capital but less innovation.

Investor sophistication has lagged behind the growing complexity of retail financial markets. To explore this, we develop a dynamic model to study the interaction between obfuscation and investor sophistication in mutual fund markets. Taking into account different learning mechanisms within the investor population, we characterize the optimal timing of obfuscation for financial institutions who offer retail products. We show that educational initiatives that are directed to facilitate learning by investors may induce providers to increase wasteful obfuscation, further disorienting investors and decreasing overall welfare. Obfuscation decreases with competition among firms, since the information rents from obfuscation dissipate as each institution attracts a smaller market share.