We propose a new measure of time-varying tail risk that is directly estimable from the cross-section of returns. We exploit firm-level price crashes every month to identify common fluctuations in tail risk among individual stocks. Our tail measure is significantly correlated with tail risk measures extracted from S&P 500 index options and negatively predicts real economic activity. We show that tail risk has strong predictive power for aggregate market returns. Cross-sectionally, stocks with high loadings on past tail risk earn an annual three-factor alpha 5.4% higher than stocks with low tail risk loadings. We explore potential mechanisms giving rise to these asset pricing facts.

ABSTRACT Can managers influence the liquidity of their firms’ shares? We use plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of public information to show that firms actively shape their information environments by voluntarily disclosing more information than regulations mandate and that such efforts improve liquidity. Firms respond to an exogenous loss of public information by providing more timely and informative earnings guidance. Responses appear motivated by a desire to reduce information asymmetries between retail and institutional investors. Liquidity improves as a result and in turn increases firm value. This suggests that managers can causally influence their cost of capital via voluntary disclosure.