This paper demonstrates how Bayesian information may be analyzed as a variable input in determining an optimal bank portfolio and investigates the impact of information in a way that is statistically satisfactory. A portfolio model is developed, and the impact of information is analyzed. Information is treated as an economic input that is used up to the point where its predicted marginal benefit is exactly equal to its marginal cost, and, from there, the optimal demand for information is derived. A comparative‐static analysis demonstrates that the reaction of optimal portfolio holdings to interest rate changes under variable uncertainty is dramatically different from portfolio behavior when uncertainty is exogenous. Finally, the elasticity of reserves with respect to scale is examined under the assumption of variable uncertainty.

In this paper, I demonstrate how Bayesian information may be analyzed as a bona fide input in determining the optimal level of precautionary balances to hold. I first examine the impact of information in revising the expected total cost function and the effect of information on optimal precautionary cash balances. I then derive the optimal demand for information, and the comparative statics of θ * are developed. Finally, I examine the elasticity of precautionary balances to scale under the assumption that the degree of uncertainty of cash needs is a decision variable for the firm or household to determine. Surprisingly, monetary balances demonstrate significant economies of scale with endogenous information.

In this paper, I demonstrate how Bayesian information may be analyzed as a bona fide input in determining the optimal level of precautionary balances to hold. I first examine the impact of information in revising the expected total cost function and the effect of information on optimal precautionary cash balances. I then derive the optimal demand for information, and the comparative statics of θ^* are developed. Finally, I examine the elasticity of precautionary balances to scale under the assumption that the degree of uncertainty of cash needs is a decision variable for the firm or household to determine. Surprisingly, monetary balances demonstrate significant economies of scale with endogenous information.

Using trended Brownian motion to characterize borrower cash needs over time, we are able to derive a probability density function for the time to depletion of a bank credit line as well as the likelihoods for the time to exhausting the sources of liquidity that fund the loan. Armed with these analytic results, we solve for the credit line mark-up rate and the configuration of stored liquidity that maximizes the bank’s intertemporal expected profits from the loan. The optimality conditions produce a system of integral differential equations whose solutions we then simulate over a host of scenarios.

This paper provides an appropriate framework to evaluate the impact of the universal reserve requirements called for by the new DIDMC Act of 1980. We derived the optimal reserve ratios for a dual banking system under the objective of controlling the monetary aggregates and the level of output. Then optimal reserve requirements were calculated from illustrative money market and macroeconomic parameters since the usual comparative statics were not useful. The results, generally, suggested optimal reserve ratios which were significantly higher than the old dual or the new universal reserve regimes for all targets. However, the calculation of values for the loss functions under various reserve regimes suggests that attainment of and may not be imperative, since the discrepancy between losses for optimal and various nonoptimal reserve schemes were not large. A major result of this paper, observed for both monetary and real targets, was that the differences in the instability of the targets for the old dual reserve ratios and the Fed's new universal reserve scheme were small. This result clearly suggests that although the DIDMC Act may solve the Federal Reserve's membership problem, it will not significantly enhance the Fed's effectiveness in controlling monetary or real sector aggregates.

This paper provides an appropriate framework to evaluate the impact of the universal reserve requirements called for by the new DIDMC Act of 1980. We derived the optimal reserve ratios for a dual banking system under the objective of controlling the monetary aggregates and the level of output. Then optimal reserve requirements were calculated from illustrative money market and macroeconomic parameters since the usual comparative statics were not useful. The results, generally, suggested optimal reserve ratios which were significantly higher than the old dual or the new universal reserve regimes for all targets. However, the calculation of values for the loss functions under various reserve regimes suggests that attainment of r 1 * , r 2 * and t * may not be imperative, since the discrepancy between losses for optimal and various nonoptimal reserve schemes were not large. A major result of this paper, observed for both monetary and real targets, was that the differences in the instability of the targets for the old dual reserve ratios and the Fed's new universal reserve scheme were small. This result clearly suggests that although the DIDMC Act may solve the Federal Reserve's membership problem, it will not significantly enhance the Fed's effectiveness in controlling monetary or real sector aggregates.

Most bank deposits contain an embedded option which permits the depositor to withdraw funds at will. Demand deposits generally allow costless withdrawal, while time deposits often require payment of an early withdrawal penalty. Managing the risk that depositors will exercise their withdrawal option is an important aspect of input pricing. This paper acknowledges the threat of deposit withdrawal and then solves for the optimal structure of bank deposit rates.

Numerous studies have analyzed how a bank's intermediation margin varies with respect to such factors as credit quality, funding risk, bank capital, deposit insurance and other factors. However, these studies ignore the potential that loans tend to prepay if interest rates decline and deposits tend to be withdrawn if interest rates rise. Taking this very fundamental fact into account, we derive optimal loan rates and deposit rates when the bank is subject to loan prepayments and deposit withdrawals. Among other things, we find that greater volatility of interest rates tends to increase the margin. The strength of the correlation between the level of interest rates and the propensity to prepay loans (withdraw deposits) also plays an interesting role.