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Dealer intermediation and price behavior in the aftermarket for new bond issues

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 86(3), 643-682
Municipal bonds trade in decentralized broker-dealer markets, and are underpriced when issued, but unlike equities the average price rises slowly over several days. Newly issued municipal bonds have high levels of price dispersion and the average price rises because the mix of trade sizes changes over time. While large trades occur close to the reoffering price, small trades occur between the reoffering price to as much as 5% above the reoffering price. Using a mixed-distribution model we quantify the losses uninformed traders or issuers give up to broker-dealers.

Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market

Review of Financial Studies 2007 20(2), 275-314
Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealer markets in which price information is costly to gather. We analyze a database of trades between broker-dealers and customers in municipal bonds. These data were only released to the public with a lag; the market was opaque. Dealers earn lower average markups on larger trades, even though dealers bear a higher risk of losses with larger trades. We estimate a bargaining model and compute measures of dealer?s bargaining power. Dealers exercise substantial market power. Our measures of market power decrease in trade size and increase in the complexity of the trade for the dealer.

Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market

Review of Financial Studies 2007 20(2), 275-314
[Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealer markets in which price information is costly to gather. We analyze a database of trades between broker-dealers and customers in municipal bonds. These data were only released to the public with a lag; the market was opaque. Dealers earn lower average markups on larger trades, even though dealers bear a higher risk of losses with larger trades. We estimate a bargaining model and compute measures of dealer's bargaining power. Dealers exercise substantial market power. Our measures of market power decrease in trade size and increase in the complexity of the trade for the dealer.]