We empirically test competing theoretical arguments about the impact of common ownership on bank stability: the common ownership hypothesis, where banks decrease risk-taking by internalizing risk externalities on commonly held banks, and the diversification hypothesis, where banks increase risk-taking influenced by common owners who hold diversified portfolios and are less risk averse. Using data from the U.S. banking industry from 1991 to 2016, we find that banks with more common ownership linkages undertake lower risk, as predicted by the common ownership hypothesis. This relation is statistically significant and economically sizable, which is consistent across alternative measures of common ownership and bank risk and robust to potential endogeneity. Our study adds the financial stability perspective to the ongoing discussions on common ownership and antitrust regulations.

We examine whether analyst coverage and mutual fund trades are complements or substitutes in the course of information incorporation into stock prices. Our empirical evidence indicates that they are complementary. Clustered trades in stocks with low analyst coverage is associated with a subsequent return reversal, which is more pronounced among less actively managed mutual funds. Mutual fund herding under low analyst coverage also amplifies future stock price crash risk through decreased corporate disclosure quality. These negative effects of mutual fund herding are not apparent for stocks with high analyst coverage. To address potential endogeneity concerns, we conduct additional tests using brokerage firm mergers and closures as exogenous shocks to analyst coverage and find consistent results. Our findings highlight the role of analysts in mitigating price-destabilizing herding behavior of mutual funds.