When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by offering workers long-term wage contracts. The optimal contract specifies a wage consisting of a spot general skill component plus a component equal to the expected time-averaged value of the worker's specific skills with a competitor. Variations in the smoothed specific component are due only to changes in expectations about the likelihood of quitting a competing firm. The theory also explains interindustry disparities in wage paths and statistical discrimination by firms.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether financial analysts with superior earnings forecasting ability can be distinguished on the basis of ex post forecast accuracy. I explore the question by estimating and comparing average accuracy across individuals, and by considering whether the observed distribution of analyst forecast accuracies differs from the distribution expected if their relative performances each year were purely random. Overall, I do not find systematic differences in forecast accuracy across individuals. Financial press coverage suggests there are superior financial analysts. For example, Institutional Investor's annual All American Research Team includes analysts rated by money managers as superior on a variety of criteria, including earnings forecasting, ability to pick stocks, and the quality of written reports. Clearly, financial analyst services other than forecast accuracy are valued by their clients. I focus on only one activity, earnings forecasting, for two reasons. First, forecast data are available, quantitative, and can be evaluated against observable earnings outcomes. Services such as insightful, well-written research reports are harder to evaluate quantitatively. Second, academic use of analyst forecasts as earnings expectations data in capital markets empir-

Prior studies of discretionary accounting choices have generally relied on one or more proxy variables to measure closeness to debt covenant restrictions without actually examining the existence or extent of restrictive covenants. This study tests the validity of the most commonly used proxy, the debt–equity ratio, by examining its relation to actual debt covenant restrictions for a random sample of U.S. firms. The results indicate that several versions of the debt–equity ratio capture the existence and tightness of retained earnings restrictionsand the existence of net tangible asset and working capital restrictions, but are unrelated to four other covenant restrictions.

In 111 publicly traded firms that either file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt between 1979 and 1985, bank lenders frequently become major stockholders or appoint new directors. On average, only 46% of incumbent directors remain when bankruptcy or debt restructuring ends. Directors who resign hold significantly fewer seats on other boards following their departure. Common-stock ownership becomes more concentrated with large blockholders and less with corporate insiders. Few firms are acquired. Collectively, these results suggest that corporate default leads to significant changes in the ownership of firms' residual claims and in the allocation of rights to manage corporate resources.

This article investigates the effect of external, national, and sectoral shocks on Canadian employment fluctuations at the national, industrial, and provincial levels. We assume that employment growth in each industry-province pair depends on U.S. growth, lagged Canadian growth at the national, industrial, and provincial levels, an aggregate shock, and shocks specific to each industry, province, and industry-province pair. We estimate that the U.s. and Canadian shocks account for two-thirds and a quarter, respectively, of aggregate variation. Sectoral shocks account for only one-tenth of aggregate variation but represent 30% of the variation from Canadian sources.

This paper presents an empirical analysis of firms that are delisted from a major stock exchange. The delisting process is described and stock price movements surrounding delisting are analyzed. For firms with prior announcements, equity values decline by approximately 8.5 percent on announcement day. For firms without prior announcements, a similar adjustment takes place between the last day of trading in the initial market and the close of the first day of trading in the new market. Four hypotheses concerning the decline in firm value are examined. These are the liquidity hypothesis, the management signalling hypothesis, the exchange certification hypothesis, and the downward sloping demand curve hypothesis. Evidence consistent with the liquidity hypothesis is presented in the paper. Unlike evidence onstock exchange listings, returns in the post-delisting period do not appear to be anomalous. © 1990, School of Business Administration, University of Washington. All rights reserved.

This paper examines the pricing of exchange-traded long-term corporate bond portfolios. Observable instruments measuring the term structure of interest rates, levels of bond and stock prices, and a January dummy are found to predict excess returns on corporate bonds. An intertemporal asset pricing model with changing expectations and unobservable factors is then estimated for the predictable excess returns using Hansen's Generalized Method of Moments. The results show that a multibeta linear time-varying model of con? ditional expected returns with constant betas can successfully value corporate bonds. Spe? cifically, the tests indicate the presence of two time-varying hedge portfolios. The data, however, support a single latent variable specification when all January observations are excluded. This result suggests the existence of a strong January seasonal in one of the latent variables.

Despite nonstationarities in the factor betas and factor prices of the Chen, Roll, Ross (1986) multifactor model, investors are rewarded for bearing risks associated with the change in expected inflation and industrial production in non-January months; however, variations in these factors have opposite influences on stock prices. These findings may partially explain why several recent studies fail to detect a significant non-January risk premium in the stock market, but this evidence is only suggestive since theoretical and statistical difficulties prevent precise interpretations of specific pricing relations in the Chen, Roll, Ross model.